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Finland found itself in an extraordinary position in the international 
political arena during the Cold War, accomplishing a successful bal-
ancing act within the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union but 
managing in spite of political"Finlandization"to preserve its nation-
al autonomy and western social order. The period was also an inter-
esting one in a military sense, as Finland was committed to fulfilling, 
or at least being prepared to fulfil, its obligations under the military 
clauses of its Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual As-
sistance (FCMA Treaty) with the Soviet Union at the same time as 
the most concrete external military threat to the country's indepen-
dence came precisely from the other party to that agreement. 
Reviews have been published earlier of trends in Finnish de-
fence policy during that period, but the actual operational plans 
have remained in the depths of the archives.' It has been possible 
to construct an overall picture of these defence plans only since the 
transfer of the majority of the confidential material in the possession 
of the Operations Division at General Headquarters to the Military 
Archives at the beginning of the present decade. The purpose of 
this paper is therefore to describe trends in operational planning 
aimed at the defence of Finland in the years 1944-1966. 
In order to facilitate the handling of this theme, we may distin-
guish the following questions to which answers are sought here: 
1. How did the spectrum of perceived threats that served as a ba-
sis for operational planning alter during that period, and did 
it correspond to the true situation in which the Finns found 
themselves? 
2. What changes took place in the mobilization system? 
3. How did the availability of hardware and equipment for the 
defence forces develop during this period? 
4. Did the exercises held conform to the operational plans? 
The relevant defence documentation was for the most part de-
clared either secret (closed for a period of 25 years) or top secret 
(closed for a period of 40 years), with the actual operational plans 
falling into the latter category. This is the main reason why the pe-
riod to be studied here is limited to 1944-1966, although the latter 
date is also justified on the grounds that the last revisions to the 
OpPlan-57 were made in the mid-1960s, just before the transfer to 
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a new peacetime organization. Thus we can with a clear conscience 
bring our study of operational planning to a close at that point. 
We had access to all the material deposited in the Military Ar-
chives that is relevant to the period in question, the most impor-
tant documents for the present purpose being those of the General 
Headquarters Operations Division, which are now available in the 
Military Archives for the period up to 1960 in the case of top secret 
documents and up to 1973 for secret ones. The main source of docu-
mentation regarding the mobilization system is the General Head-
quarters Mobilization Division (järjestelyosasto), while other mate-
rial of significance includes the documents of the Logistics Division 
which contain a large proportion of the argumentation lying behind 
the Operations Division planning. Regarding the status and amount 
of relevant material , the main archives are those of the Armaments 
Office (sotavarusteosasto), the Ordnance Division (taisteluvälineo-
sasto) and the War Economy Division (sotatalousosasto). 
The peacetime organization of the Defence Forces remained 
reasonably constant during the period in question, the General 
Headquarters having three divisions, the Armoured Brigade, the 
Navy and the Air Force subordinated to it, together with the military 
provinces and districts, which were primarily responsible for mobili-
zation. The confidential archives of the divisional headquarters were 
for the most part available to us, although it is probable that some 
material may not yet have been lodged with the Military Archives 
or may have been destroyed in connection with reductions in these 
archives. The reason for the latter situation lies in the common prac-
tise of recording the most confidential papers of all as rough drafts in 
various correspondence ledgers, so that officially they did not exist 
as recorded documents at all. It was then a relatively straightforward 
matter to destroy them. Thus it is highly likely that a large number 
of the draft documents that contained ideas put forward by plan-
ners and decision-makers in the form of notes added in the margins 
will have been lost for ever. Another problem arises from the man-
ner in which the minutes of meetings were recorded. There were 
some meeting for which no minutes existed at all, and frequently 
they were no more than laconic statements of the decisions reached. 
Thus the actual opinions of the participants and possible conflicts of 
opinion have been sucked into the black hole of history. 
Efforts were also made to render the most confidential infor-
mation secret by reducing the number of people handling it and the 
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number of documents involved to an absolute minimum. In the case 
of an infantry brigade in the post-war years of the 1950s, for in-
stance, it may well have been only the commander who was made 
aware of what the wartime mission of his brigade was. Confidenti-
ality and the classification of information also extended to General 
Headquarters itself, so that the first defence plan involving the So-
viet Union, drawn up around 1959-1960, was known only to a few 
officers serving in the Operations Division.2 In the case of the Mo-
bilization Division, whose principal task was to plan and maintain 
both the peacetime and wartime structure of the Defence Forces, 
confidentiality was achieved by dividing the division into numerous 
separate offices. Planning of peacetime force structure within the 
Mobilization Division was almost entirely independent of wartime 
deployment and matters were planned in separate offices.' 
Documentation with regard to the Air Force is problematic, as 
its headquarters has not handed over any of its confidential material 
to the Military Archives, but the situation is by no means hopeless, 
as copies of a large proportion of the documents involving Air Force 
planning as a whole were sent to the General Headquarters Opera-
tions Division as points of information and have been preserved in 
its archives. In addition, the Air Defence Division (ilmapuolustuso-
sasto) at General Headquarters had an abundant documentation on 
air defence matters, and the situation is improved still further by the 
fact that some of the documents belonging to the individual wings 
under Air Force Headquarters have been deposited in the archives. 
The situation is more promising in the case of the Navy, as its head-
quarters and the command levels subordinated to it deposited their 
top secret material in the Military Archives in 2003. 
The headquarters of the Frontier Guard, which was subordi-
nated to the Ministry of the Interior and came to occupy a critical 
role in the defence of the eastern frontier of Finland in the early 
1960s, has still not lodged its confidential documentation with the 
Military Archives. Its leadership nevertheless looked favourably on 
the present research project and granted access to the confidential 
material in the organization's possession. 
Virtually no intelligence or counter-intelligence documents 
were available for the present purpose, however, as they are pre-
sumably still in the organization's own archives or else have been 
destroyed. It should be remembered that the General Headquarters 
of the Defence Forces did not have a separate intelligence organi- 
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zation directly after the war, and it was only in 1951 that the Chief 
of General Staff, Major-General A. Sundman, ordered the chief of 
the International Division to take charge of intelligence.` We have 
had access to reviews by the International Division. The command 
structure was clarified in 1959, with the creation of an Inspection Of-
fice (tarkastustoimisto) within the Information Division (tiedotuso-
sasto), and this was extended a few years later to form an Inspection 
Division. It was not until 1968 that the latter became known as the 
Intelligence Division.' Thus we will not be concerned at all here with 
military intelligence or the submission of daily situation reports, but 
will be content to examine the threats, or more precisely the threat 
scenarios used in operational planning, at the level of accuracy at 
which they were set out in the Operations Division documents. 
The Ministry of Defence relinquished the confidential papers 
of its Defence Council, founded in 1957, to the Military Archives a 
couple of years ago. A large proportion of these documents consist 
of highly confidential reports and proposals drawn up by various di-
visions of General Headquarters for presentation to that committee. 
We also had access to memorandums and minutes of the Defence 
Council for the period 1957-1965. 
We have managed to form a fairly clear picture of Swedish and 
Norwegian plans regarding Finland on the basis of the latest research 
literature, but a huge gap remains with respect to the eastern fron-
tier, as virtually nothing is known of Soviet operational planning. Al-
though considerable amounts of Warsaw Pact documents have been 
released for research use in recent years and have been discussed at 
international conferences arranged by the Parallel History Project, 
for instance, the Russian Federation has adopted a strictly secretive 
line with regard to operational plans drawn up in Soviet times. No 
documents referring to Finland have been discovered in the former 
Warsaw Pact archives, and current information has it that Soviet op-
erations north of the Gulf of Finland were carried out entirely by 
Soviet troops, so that the other Warsaw Pact countries will have had 
nothing whatsoever to do with them, nor were they even informed 
about them, for reasons of secrecy. 
It became evident at the very beginning of the work that the use 
of archive material alone would create only a partial impression of 
the situation. In broad terms, one might say that a huge gap remains 
with respect to the eastern frontier in the case of Finnish planning 
as well. The threat posed by the Soviet Union is either not discussed 
at all or is referred to in covert terms, although there are some al-
lusions to the Soviet Union in the documents, especially from 1960 
onwards. In order to ensure that this question did not rest entirely 
on our own interpretations of the documents, however, we decided 
to fall back on interviews, mainly to shed light on how the Soviet 
threat affected operational planning. For this purpose we chose to 
interview four distinguished General Staff officers who served in 
the Operations or Mobilization Division of General Headquarters 
in the 1950s and 1960s: Lieutenant-General Ermei Kanninen (b. 
1922), who served in the Operations Division on two occasions, as a 
staff officer in 1958-1963 and as divisional chief in 1967-1971, Ma-
jor-General Juhani Ruutu (b. 1922), who served in the Operations 
Division in several capacities in 1963-1969, Colonel T. Olavi Lehti 
(b. 1915), the oldest of the interviewees, who served there for two 
periods in the 1950s, in 1951-1955 and 1958-1962, and finally, in 
order to determine the role of the Mobilization Division in defence 
planning, Lieutenant-General Sakari Annala (b. 1928), who served 
there in 1961-1968. 
We would emphasize that this research is concerned above all 
with planning. We do not attempt to evaluate the real strength or 
capacity of the Defence Forces, but rather we aim to provide a basic 
account of their operational plans. Although we put forward some 
Western evaluations of the readiness of the Finns to defend their 
country, we do not attempt to speculate on how the Finnish po-
litical leadership might have behaved in a crisis. That is something 
that belongs to the political historians, if it belongs to history at all. 
It may appear to a foreign reader that operational planning in Fin-
land in the 1950s had very little to do with politics, and if pushed, 
we might be tempted to admit that this impression is a correct one. 
Finland did not go in for the same defence policy outlines that were 
common in Great Britain in the same period, for instance, but rather 
the Finnish Defence Forces were acting in isolation from the rest of 
society up until the early 1960s, which was when total defence plan-
ning and coordination really got under way. The forces have never 
traditionally been looked on as a political instrument, but rather as a 
last resort in the struggle to ensure the survival of the nation. In the 
Finnish security philosophy the Defence Forces have constituted a 
"poor man's deterrent". 
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2. The operating environment of the 
defence forces 
2.1. Internal and foreign policy operating environments 
The ceasefire that came into force on 5th September 1944 placed Fin-
land in an utterly new, extremely difficult political situation, for in 
spite of having successfully fended off the Soviet offensive in the 
arduous battles of summer 1944, the country found itself in the po-
sition of one of those defeated in the war. As the Allied Powers had 
already agreed that the final peace treaty with the Axis block and 
its allies would be concluded at a joint peace conference, the Soviet 
Union, Great Britain and Finland signed an Armistice Agreement 
on 19th September 1944, under the terms of which Finland was to 
expel the total of over 200,000 German troops present in the north-
em part of the country. The secret agreement between the Finns and 
the Germans that the latter could retreat more or less in peace fell 
through when the Allied Control Commission, composed in practise 
mainly of Russians, called for a more active operation on the part of 
the Finns. Eventually this"fake war" ended with the Finns landing at 
Tornio at the beginning of October and provoking some six months 
of hostilities under strenuous winter conditions that led to the al-
most complete destruction of the infrastructure of Lapland. 
The task of disarming the German troops in northern Finland 
delayed implementation of the demand for the demobilization of 
the Finnish Defence Forces by 5th December that had been written 
into the Armistice Agreement. In addition, the Control Commission 
rejected the Finns' demobilization plans, which would have returned 
the Defence Forces to their 1941 strength of about 64,000 men. In-
stead, the Commission ordered their strength to be reduced to that 
prevailing before the Winter War, i.e. it was not to exceed 37,000 
men. The command to implement the order given by the Commis-
sion was issued in November 1944.6 
There was another condition stated in the Armistice Agreement 
that was also a serious military blow to the Finns, the demand that 
the peninsula of Porkkala, located only 30 km west of the capital, 
Helsinki, should be leased to the Soviet Union for 50 years. The re-
linquishing of the fortifications in this area to the Russians meant 
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the creation of a serious gap in the strong defensive chain around 
the capital, and the Russians exploited this to the full and estab-
lished a powerful base on the peninsula.7 
Apart from substantially weakening the Finns capacity to de- 
fend their capital city, the Armistice Agreement also called for the 
complete demilitarization of the Åland Islands, which systematically 
undermined the Finns' ability to protect their marine connections 
to the west and north. The demolition and elimination of military 
installations began before the end of 1944, and with the exception 
of minesweeping operations in some sea areas, the work was com-
pleted by the end of September 1945.8 
The Control Commission also placed numerous restrictions on 
the activities of the Finnish Defence Forces in addition to the pro- 
visions of the Armistice Agreement, among which particular men-
tion should be made of the instructions issued in March 1945 on the 
composition of the coastal artillery. One consequence of these was 
that all the heavy artillery batteries located east of Porkkala were to 
be dismantled and transferred to the Navy depot for storage.9 
Although the Armistice Agreement did not contain any actual 
armament restrictions, these were included in the eventual Treaty 
of Peace, signed in Paris in 1947, the aim of which was to deprive 
Finland of any offensive capacity and to restrict the activities of the 
Defence Forces"to meeting tasks of internal character and local de- 
fence of frontiers". The total tonnage of the Finnish Navy was limited 
to 10,000 tonnes and the Air Force to 60 aircraft. Offensive weapons 
such as bomber aircraft, atomic weapons, motor torpedo-boats, sub-
marines, non-contact types of sea mines and guided missiles were 
entirely forbidden.10 
The most problematic point of all in the treaty from a military 
point of view was the restriction of the total strength of the Finnish 
Defence Forces to 41,900 men, a figure which included the Frontier 
Guard, even though this organization was subordinate to the Min-
istry of the Interior. The treaty required the superfluous equipment 
(Finland had had 15 divisions mobilized against the Soviet Union at 
the time of the cessation of hostilities) to be forfeited to the Allies or 
destroyed within a year of its signing. Literal compliance with this 
requirement would have deprived Finland of all possibilities for de-
fending its territory. In practise, however, the Cold War came to the 
rescue of the Defence Forces, as Britain and the Soviet Union were 
never able to reach agreement over what was to be done with the 
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superfluous material and so it was never handed over to the Allies 
at all. Instead it remained in the hands of the Finns and formed the 
main body of equipment available to the army up until the 1970s." 
The years immediately following the Second World War are 
often referred to in Finland as the "years of danger". Nothing was 
known of Soviet strategic goals with regard to this country and there 
were serious fears that the ultimate goal was occupation.12 This im-
pression was only confirmed by the fact that internal politics within 
Finland was in a state of turmoil. The difficult economic situation and 
the internal struggles between left-wing factions within the trade 
union movement led to frequent unrest and strikes, and there were 
naturally fears that the fanning of internal dissent was one means by 
which the Soviet Union would gradually reduce Finland to the same 
state of submission as the people's democracies of Eastern Europe. 
As a result, a ring of officers in the Defence Forces organized an arms 
concealment operation during autumn 1944, and material sufficient 
to equip some 30 000 men was sequestered.13 
In actual fact it seems that the Soviet leadership was attempting 
to avoid any debilitation of the Finnish economy, in order to have 
the war reparations delivered on time.14 Thus the pattern of events 
leading up to a communist coup did not take place in Finland as it 
had done elsewhere, even though the threat of this was perceived 
in Finland and in the West alike, especially in 1948.15 Although the 
rumours of an attempted communist take-over proved unfounded, 
at least the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, General Si-
hvo, and President Paasikivi were inclined to take them seriously.16 
The situation was resolved when Finland and the Soviet Union 
concluded their Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance (FCMA Treaty) in 1948. This, after all, was an advanta-
geous step as far as Finland was concerned, as it did not contain 
any provision for automatic military assistance but simply obliged 
Finland to defend its own territory in the event of either Finland 
or the Soviet Union being attacked by Germany or any of its allies. 
The attack would be repelled within the boundaries of Finland, with 
Soviet assistance or by joint action if necessary, but only after joint 
consultations to establish the true existence of a threat.17 
The internal political arena was unstable throughout the 1950s, 
as reflected by the fact that the country had fifteen governments over 
a period of ten years, and the military situation in Europe as a whole 
also continued to be tense. The rearmament of West Germany in 
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particular gave rise to military tensions in Central Europe, or at least 
the Soviet Union used this as a pretext, and although Finland was 
somewhat to one side of the focal point of the conflict, the confron-
tation between the major powers was a reality very close to the Finn-
ish border, as Norway became a member of NATO in 1949, which 
meant that the organization had bases in vicinity of the Kola Pen-
insula, which would during later decades become one of the main 
locations for Soviet strategic nuclear weapons.18 At the same time 
the Soviet Union and its allies controlled the southern shore of the 
Baltic all the way west as far as the West German boundary. 
Sweden's neutrality was a matter of great importance to Fin-
land, as it meant that the two major power blocks came face to face 
only in the very north of Scandinavia, a region that did indeed merit 
a special position in Finnish defence arrangements. One can only 
speculate as to the security requirements that the Soviet Union might 
have imposed on Finland if Sweden had joined NATO, for instance. 
As it was, a certain sensitive balance prevailed in relations between 
Sweden, Norway, Finland and the Soviet Union which none of the 
parties wished to upset. Norway did not wish to exacerbate the mili-
tary situation in Finnmark, as this might have led the Soviet Union 
to increase its pressure on Finland, which could in turn have led to 
an extension of the Russians' air surveillance network into Finnish 
territory, and the Swedish logic ran along similar lines. On the other 
hand, it was thought that the Soviet Union did not want to exert 
pressure on Finland, as that would have pushed Sweden further 
than ever towards a military alliance, and it was naturally in Soviet 
interests to keep Sweden unaligned. Neutrality was naturally the 
best course for the Finns, too, as the only realistic alternative would 
have been closer cooperation with the Soviet Union. 
The highlights of Finnish foreign policy in the 1950s were the 
acts of joining the United Nations and the Nordic Council in 1955, 
and perhaps the most significant event from a military point of view 
was the return of the Porkkala area to Finnish sovereignty in 1956. 
Although this was viewed in Britain as no more than a Soviet po-
litical trick which would also rid it of an unnecessary military base, 
the withdrawal was a matter of considerable military significance for 
Finland,19 as it meant that the defence of Helsinki, which had been 
under threat for nearly ten years, could at last be reorganized. 
The Soviet Union exerted overt pressure on Finland on two oc-
casions in the late 1950s and early 1960s: the "Night Frost crisis" of 
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1958 and a diplomatic note three years later by which the Finns were 
summoned for the consultations allowed for under the Agreement 
of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, but in both cases 
there are several interpretations in existence as to whether there 
were any intentions other than to strengthen the position of Urho 
Kekkonen as President.2O With its overwhelming superiority in terms 
of conventional weapons, the Soviet Union scarcely had anything to 
fear from the rearmament of West Germany that it quoted as the 
reason for the consultations. Yet, the diplomatic note had positive 
consequences for the Finnish Defence Forces, as it led to a commit-
ment by the political leadership, and most of all by the President, 
to purchase new equipment from the Soviet Union.21 On the other 
hand, the note crisis was at least seemingly detrimental to Finland's 
international position. 
2.2. Defence policy guidelines 
The organization of the higher echelons of the command of the 
Finnish Defence Forces differed markedly from that prevailing in 
many of the Western European countries at that time, as purely mili-
tary matters—such as operational planning or peacetime training—as 
such were entrusted to different authorities from those responsible 
for defence administration and the determination of defence policy. 
Under the Constitution, the Supreme Commander of the Defence 
Forces was the President, while the Ministry of Defence was respon-
sible for the relevant legislation, the drawing up and implementation 
of the defence budget, and property management, while all military 
defence functions, including training and both peacetime and war-
time operational planning, were in the hands of the Commander-in-
Chief of the Defence Forces and General Headquarters.22 
The radical change in Finland's defence position that was 
brought about by the signing of the Armistice Agreement caused the 
Cabinet to set up a separate Defence Revision Committee in May 
1945 with the task of reorganizing the country's defences. This com-
mittee submitted an extensive report in March 1949 that addressed 
a wide variety of issues: the peacetime organization of the defence 
forces, their wartime composition and the international position of 
Finland in terms of defence policy. The last-mentioned issue, which 
will be discussed in further detail later, is extremely interesting as it 
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formed a basis for the threat scenarios that were employed in opera-
tional planning. 
Once the Revision Committee had completed its work, a period 
of almost ten years ensued during which the country's politicians 
and civilian authorities were not committed to any very extensive 
preparations for defence. There were a number of reasons for this. 
In the first place, any preparations for mobilization could have been 
interpreted as infringements of the Peace Treaty of Paris and would 
have constituted an exclusively Finnish interpretation of that trea- 
ty 	the terms of the treaty itself did not distinguish between 
peacetime and wartime deployment of the armed forces. Secondly, 
the political situation within the country was such that the extreme 
left wing felt that it was precisely within the defence forces that 
the greatest opposition to their objectives was to be found, a sus-
picion that was indeed mutual, since the leadership of the defence 
forces was of the opinion that the greatest number of individuals 
and groups who posed a threat to national security existed among 
the left-wing extremists. Thus the most characteristic feature of the 
operational preparations laid down in the 1950s was the meticu-
lous secrecy that surrounded them. The plans were known only to 
the minimum number of people necessary for their elaboration and 
were not automatically communicated even to the Ministry of De-
fence and the President, although the latter was probably informed 
of them from time to time. 
Finland had had a Defence Council prior to the Second World 
War which had advised the President, issued statements and made 
proposals on defence arrangements in general, but this had been 
composed almost entirely of military officers and had not succeeded 
in gathering representatives of all aspects of the country's defence 
round the same table.23 Thus the post-war Revision Committee pro-
posed that a supreme advisory Defence Council should be set up, 
consisting of all the ministers responsible for the different branches 
that contributed to the nation's defence. Implementation of this did 
not succeed in connection with the reorganization of the Defence 
Forces in 1952, however, and was delayed for a further five years.24 
Finally a statute was promulgated in March 1957 that defined the 
duties of the Defence Council as being to coordinate the country's 
overall defences and draw up the necessary financial plans. The 
council was to be chaired by the Prime Minister, or by the President 
if present, and its members were to be the Ministers of Defence, 
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Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Finance and Trade and Industry. The 
military were to be represented by the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Defence Forces and the Chief of General Staff.25 
The Defence Council was fairly active in the years 1957-1965, 
meeting an average of ten times a year and expressing distinct opin-
ions on the matters entrusted to it under the statute. The emphasis 
was on the allocations made to defence within the national bud-
get, material acquisitions, long-term developmental plans and the 
peacetime composition of the Defence Forces. It should also be 
noted that the main outlines of the content of the national opera-
tional plans were placed before the Defence Council. The work of 
the council was not especially consistent in the long term, however, 
as its composition varied constantly on account of frequent changes 
of government, on no less than eight occasions between 1957 and 
1964, and one is left with the impression that the long-term plans 
put forward by the Defence Forces for several years at a time suffered 
considerably from this lack of continuity. It is nevertheless signifi-
cant that the council succeeded in inducing the politicians to com-
mit themselves to questions of national defence. 
2.3. Peacetime composition of the Defence Forces 
Under the revision of the peacetime composition of the Defence 
Forces in 1952 the army came to consist of three divisions, each re-
sponsible for the development of a defence capability in its own re-
gion, and the ground troops were subordinated to these, except for 
the Armoured Brigade, which remained responsible directly to the 
General Headquarters. The Coastal and Anti-Aircraft Artillery was 
incorporated into the army, so that each division also had troops of 
this category. The country was divided into seven military provinces 
and 27 military districts for mobilization purposes. At the same time 
the Air Force was divided into three wings and the Navy into two 
bases and two flotillas.26 
This composition remained constant until 1966, being largely 
unaffected by the new National Defence Statute of 1960. The great-
est visible change, which admittedly was of no functional signifi-
cance, was the restoration of the old historical and provincial names 
for the units at the beginning of 1957. 
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Figure 1. Composition of the Finnish Defence Forces in 1952. 
under peacetime conditions, although a gradual reinforcement of the 
defences in northern Finland was undertaken from the early 1960s 
onwards, when a significant re-deployment of troops took place, the 
most notable of which was the transfer of the Jaeger Battalion to 
Lapland. The principal reorganization in southern Finland was the 
transfer of the Helsinki naval base and part of the Coastal Artillery 
Regiment to the Porkkala region after it had been relinquished by 
the Soviet Union.27 
2.4. Defence allocations from the nationalbudget 
The immediate post-war years were economically difficult ones. The 
conditions of the Armistice Agreement had included the payment 
of war reparations amounting to 300 million dollars to the Soviet 
Union. In practice, however, the sum was virtually double this, as the 
Soviet government unilaterally declared that the goods to be sup-
plied should be assessed at their very much lower pre-war prices.28 
These reparations, the task of resettling more than 400,000 refu-
gees from the territories ceded to the Soviet Union, and the loss of 
a workforce of some 90,000 men killed in the war and more than 
90,000 injured to a greater or lesser extent29 meant that the resources 
available for the defence budget prior to the mid-1950s were ex- 
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Type of Unit 
I Infantry 
A Artillery or anti-airc 
C Coastal artillery 
AF Air Force 
NA Nav 
Figure 2. Deployment of the Finnish Defence Forces in 1960 
tremely limited." 
Defence accounted for its smallest proportion of the national 
budget, only 3-4%, in the years 1947-1950, after which the figure 
settled at 5-6%, with the exception of 1962, when the credit of 12,000 
million Finnish marks granted by the Soviet Union for material pur-
chases raised the level to 8.4% of total government expenditure. All 
in all, just over 300,000 million marks31 were spent on defence in the 
period 1945-1964.32 
2.5. Finland as an operational area 
When setting out to evaluate operational planning in the Defence 
Forces it is reasonable to begin by taking a brief look at the military 
geography of the period in question. From the point of view of the 
structure of its communications network Finland was quite a differ-
ent country in the 1950s from what it is today. The long distances, 
sparse population, partly undeveloped connections and harsh cli-
mate placed all manner of demands and restrictions on both the 
mobility and equipment of defenders and invaders alike. 
The territory of Finland can be divided in terms of military ge-
ography into four regions with distinctive patterns of relief and typi-
cal terrain:33 
- the coastal plains, 
- the Lake Region, or inland region, 
- the Forest Region of Kainuu, Kuusamo and southern Lap-
land, and 
- the fells of Lapland. 
The coastal zone typically had a fairly low relief with broad 
expanses of fields and large numbers of rivers, forming plains that 
extended some 50-100 kilometres inland around the whole coast 
of the country from the Gulf of Finland as far as the head of the 
Gulf of Bothnia. It was in this coastal area that the majority of the 
settlement had been concentrated, and thus the infrastructure was 
relatively well developed for its time. It was naturally here that the 
major ports were located, and the plains close to the coast formed 
the most suitable terrain for motorized troops, although there were 
admittedly substantial regional differences in this respect. The broad 
agricultural plains of Ostrobothnia and southwestern Finland, for 
instance, were far more suited to mechanized warfare than was the 
19 
southeastern corner of the country, where there were less fields and 
the road network was less dense. In spite of the fields and plains, 
southern Finland was basically forested terrain, as the forests began 
as soon as one passed beyond the fields and centres of population.3" 
The substantial agricultural areas in the coastal zone provided ample 
opportunities for tactical landings, a situation that is summed up 
well by the statement in one writing on the military doctrines of 
the major powers dating from 1966 that"An invader can follow the 
patterns of her offensive doctrine over the majority of the coastal 
area."35  
The coast itself had a typical fragmentary nature, especially in 
the south-west, where the mainland was protected by an archipel-
ago with an abundance of small islands and reefs that placed se-
vere restrictions on the use of large naval detachments or vessels 
of any notable size. The movement of large ships was restricted to a 
fairly small number of deep channels. Thus the area between Turku 
and the Aland Islands was of great importance to Finland, forming 
geographically a gateway to the Gulf of Bothnia, where in any case 
movements in the middle of winter were restricted by the sea ice. 
The Lake Region begins at the edge of the coastal plains and 
is bounded by the Salpaussell<ä ridge in the south and by the vast 
forests of northern Karelia and southern Kainuu in the north. This 
is a region that is broken up by thousands of lakes, the fragmenta-
tion being especially pronounced close to the eastern border, and 
the main roads and railways seek out the tongues of land that sepa-
rate these lakes. Hills become more prominent towards the north. 
One special feature of the eastern part of this region was the"Salpa 
Line", which similarly relied on narrow tongues of land between 
the lakes and was supplied with large numbers of fortifications of 
different kinds in the years 1940-1944 in order to serve as a last line 
of defence. The focal point of this line lay in the southeastern corner 
of the country, stretching from Lappeenranta to the Gulf of Finland 
coast, which was expected to bear the brunt of the Soviet offensive 
once the Karelian isthmus was taken.36 
The characteristic feature of the northern parts of the Forest 
Region is its sharp relief. This area, which is still largely uninhabited 
even today, possessed vast expanses of peat bog and dense forest, 
with a very sparse road network, in addition to which the area was 
again broken up by numerous lakes. This region occupied a key po-
sition as far as the profile of the whole country was concerned, as it 
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offered a relatively useful, narrow line of defence against an attack 
from the north. On the other hand, it would have been relatively 
easy for an assailant from the east to cut the country in half at that 
point, as the Red Army had planned to do in the Winter War.37 
The northernmost part of Finland was the least inhabited of all, 
with a mean population density of less than two persons per square 
kilometre, and virtually all of the settlement was concentrated along 
the main roads and beside the rivers. The terrain typically consists of 
vast peat bogs, relatively low-growing forests, fells rising to heights 
of a few hundred metres and a very sparse road network. There were 
two roads crossing the region in a north-south direction, and most 
important from a military point of view, scarcely any roads running 
east-west by which an invader could have re-directed the main ef-
fort of his offensive, the first road to cross the country in this direc-
tion being in southern Lapland. It should also be noted that there 
were only two roads leading into this region of Finland from the 
Soviet Union. 
The railways occupied a key position in the post-war period as 
far as both civilian transport and possible military transport in the 
event of a crisis were concerned, as there was an extreme shortage of 
motor vehicles in Finland at that time.31 The rail network was dens-
est in the south of the country, connecting most of the major towns, 
but it became sparser northwards and was non-existent in the far 
north. As far as potential Soviet movements were concerned, it is 
important to note that the Finnish and Soviet railway systems were 
linked at three points and that by virtue of their common gauge, 
Russian rolling stock had immediate access to the Finnish network. 
The advent of the jet age in the 1950s placed new demands 
on the country's airports, the network of which was still underde-
veloped towards the end of that decade. It was estimated in 1958 
that Finland had only four airfields at which jet planes could oper-
ate, of which three were located in the south. Five more were under 
construction, however, and another five were thought to be easily 
convertible to military use. In terms of their geographical location, it 
should be noted that there was not a single airport that was suitable 
for military jet traffic in the very north of the country, nor even one 
that could be adapted for this purpose.39 
Climatically, Finland is without doubt a challenging environ-
ment for the deployment of armed forces. The mean January tem-
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Figure 3. Principal transport connections in Finland in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s 
22 
with corresponding figures of -7°C in Helsinki and -10°C in Mikkeli 
in the Lake Region, while snow depths varied from 60 cm in north-
ern Lapland to 20 or 30 cm on the coast. Conversely, the mean July 
temperature in the north of Lapland was 16°C and that in Helsinki 
18°C.4° Alongside this there are also the extremes in daylight condi-
tions, as the sun does not rise at all between mid-November and 
mid-January in the far north, while the south coast has 6-7 hours of 
daylight, and correspondingly the north of the country experiences 
up to two months of constant daylight in summer, when even in the 
south there are just a few hours of dusk. 
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3. Defending the new eastern border 
When the ceasefire came into force on 411 September 1944, the Head-
quarters Operations Division gave orders for the army to prepare to 
retreat behind the boundary determined in the Treaty of Moscow 
and to assume defensive positions there.41 The work of drawing up 
defence plans commenced at the same time as the peace negotia-
tions were proceeding in Moscow, for there was no real confidence 
in the Soviet desire for peace. Thus preparation for further defensive 
action went ahead all the time the negotiations continued.42 
The intention was to deploy the main force in front of the Salpa 
Line, in order to be able to take advantage of the full depth of this 
line of fortifications that had been established after the Winter War.43  
Later, when the armistice came into force, the army was obliged 
to retreat behind the newly defined border by 3rd October 1944.44 
Some divisions and brigades had nevertheless been concentrated 
in northern Finland at the beginning of September, when a sever-
ing of relations with the Germans seemed imminent, and for this 
reason not all the army units deployed at the time are indicated in 
the diagram. 45 
Gradually the task of patrolling the eastern border was trans-
ferred to the Frontier Guard, although initially under the command 
of the army officers in charge of the local units. It was only when the 
army began to assume its peacetime deployment on 26th November 
1944 that responsibility was vested entirely in the Frontier Guard.46 
Once the Allied Control Commission had arrived in Helsinki, 
a group of high-level officers from it set out to inspect the General 
Headquarters at Mikkeli. In addition to the operations against the 
Germans in Lapland, they were interested in the situation on the 
Soviet border. After receiving a report on this the inspectors accused 
the Finns of a breach of the spirit of the Armistice Agreement and 
demanded that all the orders and maps indicating the deployment of 
the Finnish field army should be handed over to the Commission.' 
In actual fact the Finnish military leadership had doubted the sincer-
ity of the Soviet Union in autumn 1944 and had placed the troops on 
the new border in full readiness for a resumption of hostilities. 
By the beginning of 1945 the General Headquarters Operations 
Division had iterated a new basis for mobilization, in which each 
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Figure 4. Deployment of Finnish army units on the eastern border in 
October 1944 
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military district should establish one battalion at the initial stage and 
arm this with the weapons that had been hidden away. These bat-
talions should then be responsible for defending crucial military in-
stallations and the nine field depots.48 This was in effect a matter of 
protecting the mobilization process. 
The second stage of mobilization was based on the principle 
that Finland could not remain a military vacuum, as a severing of 
relations between the victorious Allied Powers seemed likely. Thus 
Colonel Nihtilä, chief of the Operations Division, had conceived the 
idea that the army's infantry regiments, light brigade and indepen-
dent Jaeger battalions should be supplemented to form light infan-
try brigades. The aim was to form 11 or 12 of these. 
In order to avoid a situation in which the material supplies 
necessary for these troops were in a central depot and could only 
be obtained slowly, the material in the possession of the peacetime 
garrisons had been augmented. The Control Commission drew at-
tention to this and demanded that this material should be curtailed. 
The idea had been that fourth battalions should be formed that were 
armed with equipment taken from the hidden stores and that these 
should be linked to the light brigades. The remaining battalions 
would then be formed into brigades suitable for guerrilla warfare 
and border patrol duties.49 
The third stage of mobilization, provided that sufficient equip-
ment was available, would have been the creation of the main body 
of a field army in accordance with the procedure adopted after the 
Winter War.S' 
Although there was talk of a new basis for the mobilization sys-
tem at General Headquarters in winter 1945, it was deemed neces-
sary to order the cessation of practical preparations for this in the 
January so as to avoid accusations of provocation.51  
Although the scheme outlined above was directed at repelling 
a possible Soviet offensive, opinions adapted to the realities of the 
situation fairly quickly. By the summer of 1945 the new chief of the 
Operations Division, Colonel O. Huhtala, had sent a memorandum 
to the Commander-.in-Chief of the Defence Forces dealing with 
Finland's military position and the duties of the army under the pre-
vailing conditions, in which he considered the country's position as 
a neighbour to the Soviet Union and came to the conclusion that the 
Soviet interests were to be borne in mind in everything that was un-
dertaken. In order to preserve its own sovereignty, Finland should be 
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prepared in the event of a war between the Allied Powers to defend 
its territory in accordance with Soviet requirements.52 Where Nihtilä 
was inclined to direct his defensive preparations towards the east, 
Huhtala preferred in the light of political realities to regard the west 
as the primary focus of his defence plans. 
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4. Preparations for defence in the west 
4.1. The official threat from the west — a strategic evalua-
tion of military defences 
Where the Soviet Union had been looked on as the only threat to 
Finnish independence in the Baltic region prior to the Winter War, 
the position now was entirely different. In its compilation of the main 
points of departure for defining the post-war situation, the Defence 
Revision Committee stated in its report of 1949 that "The friendly 
relations that prevail with the Soviet Union rule out the possibility 
of war in that direction."53 In other words, the Agreement of Friend-
ship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance combined with the distinct 
world power status that the Soviet Union occupied had radically al-
tered Finnish views as expressed in official documents. 
The report noted that it was the mission of the Defence Forces 
to meet the military requirements for preserving Finland's neutral-
ity and ensuring that the country remained outside any future war, 
and named the southwestern and southern parts of the country as 
the most seriously threatened in this respect. It would be impossible 
to occupy the whole country through a surprise attack because of 
its size, but a partial surprise restricted to the most important re-
gions was quite possible by means of a bold and ruthless airborne 
operation, for instance. In the committee's view the loss of one area 
in connection with renewed hostilities would not be decisive. Lap-
land, for instance, was not essential to Finland's survival in view of 
its small population and the underdeveloped nature of its infrastruc-
ture, although the committee did predict quite realistically that the 
various parts of the country could vary in importance depending on 
fluctuations in the overall situation. Similarly it noted that amphibi-
ous operations and associated extensive naval operations were pos-
sible only in certain, rather restricted areas.54 
The Revision Committee reckoned that southern and south-
western Finland were the most important areas as far as ensuring 
the nation's vitality was concerned—given that the target should 
be to maintain a hold on the crucial areas under all circumstances. 
An attack on Lapland was a possibility, however, and preparations 
should be made to ensure its neutrality by force of arms in order to 
avoid the country's involvement in a future major war.55 
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But who would the aggressor be? The Revision Committee made 
every attempt to avoid naming any potential aggressor, contenting 
itself with mentioning that it would most probably be a question of 
Finland becoming embroiled in a conflict between the Western and 
Eastern blocks. The Finnish airspace, and in certain situations its land 
area, could be of considerable significance to the Western powers in 
the event of a military operation against the Soviet Union, while in 
accordance with the spirit of the cooperation agreement, the com-
mittee noted that no threat from the Soviet Union existed, on ac-
count of the friendly relations between the two countries.56 Whoever 
the aggressor might be, it was clear that the Finns could not fall back 
complacently on international agreements or the apparent support 
of the United Nations, but would have to defend the country them-
selves. Otherwise the area would constitute a military vacuum that 
would inevitably attract foreign forces from outside in the event of 
a conflict breaking out. The conclusion to be drawn from all this, 
which was naturally never stated aloud, concerned the Soviet Union, 
of course, which should never be given a pretext to pursue any right 
of its own to defend Finlands' 
The Revision Committee laid down that peacetime preparations 
should be made that would ensure sufficiently quick and reliable 
mobilization of fast deployment forces, whose principal task was to 
cover the full mobilization, and if necessary of the whole extent of 
the wartime defence forces.'$ 
Although, as observed earlier, the Defence Revision Commit-
tee's report excluded the Soviet Union from Finland's possible ene-
mies, defence against Soviet aggression was not forgotten. President 
J. K. Paasikivi s view on this was quite clear, as noted in his diary:"We 
had to comply with the demands of the cooperation agreement but 
still be prepared for the Soviets breaking that agreement and invad-
ing by force."59 The view expressed in a secret analysis carried out 
by the Operations Division at General Headquarters pointed in the 
same direction, as it concluded that operational plans would have to 
be made for defending the country from an attack from either the 
east or the west.60 
In the light of the above factors the Operations Division evolved 
three threat scenarios in 1951 which were to become the foundation 
and official model of the interpretation of the external threat to Fin-
land throughout the 1950s. Operational plans were thus based on 
three alternative models for western offensives against this country, 
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in which use of the territory of Sweden and control of the Straits of 
Denmark formed the main points of departure. Another important 
feature was that defence would be in the hands of Finnish Defence 
Forces, so that the outcomes of any possible negotiations with the 
Soviet Union were not taken into consideration at all.61 Work on the 
construction of these scenarios evidently began in 1948 at the latest, 
at the point where President Paasikivi gave permission to start on 
the preparation of operational and mobilization planning.62 
4.1.1. Alternative A-an attack from northern Norway63 
The guiding assumption in Alternative A was that the potential 
aggressor would not be able to make use of Swedish territory and 
that the Straits of Denmark and the Baltic Sea would be under So-
viet control, so that the offensive against Finland would have to be 
launched from northern Norway, evidently with the strategic objec-
tive of pre-empting a Soviet advance through Norwegian territory 
to the Atlantic coast. Such an offensive would also mean that the 
Western powers would be able to use northern Finland as a base 
for proceeding to attack the railway line running from Murmansk 
to Leningrad, a vital communication line during the Second World 
War64  and advance to the coast of the Arctic Ocean in order to dis-
able the Soviet Northern Fleet. It was also presumed that an attack 
of this kind on Finland would affect Swedish military policy. 
The enemy strength was estimated at no more than 6-7 divi-
sions, and the terrain was expected to restrict the advance of motor-
ized troops to the small number of main roads. It was envisaged that 
probably no more than one airborne division would be used to back 
up the invading ground troops. 
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4.1.2. Alternative B—an attack from northern Norway and 
a landing in Southern Finland65 
Alternative B was again constructed on the assumption that the ag-
gressor would not be able to make use of the territory of Sweden, 
but it was now presumed that the Straits of Denmark and the Baltic 
Sea would be part of the war zone, so that an attack could be made 
on Finland from the Baltic and through northern Norway simulta-
neously. The projected strategic objective was that of influencing the 
attitudes of both Finland and Sweden towards the power groups 
engaged in the war by occupying all or part of Finland. Again it was 
assumed that a Western alliance would be attempting to restrict So-
viet activities on the Baltic Sea, Gulf of Finland and Arctic Ocean and 
to create bases for a possible attack on Leningrad. 
It was thought that an attack on southwestern Finland might 
have two main objectives: 
- To capture the Åland Islands in order to ensure freedom 
of movement for naval forces on the Baltic Sea and Gulf of 
Bothnia, create a good tactical position in relation to the So-
viet Baltic Fleet and put pressure on Sweden. 
- To occupy the Hanko—Porkkala area in order to isolate the 
Soviet Baltic Fleet in the Gulf of Finland, achieve partial free-
dom of movement on the Gulf of Finland and threaten the 
Soviet flank on the southern shore of the Gulf of Finland. 
It was regarded as unlikely that a landing in southwestern Fin-
land would be restricted to just a few directions as would be case in 
northern Finland, and it was thought to be extremely difficult to es-
timate the possible strength of the enemy forces. It would be neces-
sary for the enemy to take possession of the ports, as the disembar-
kation would have to take place from ships. It was also expected that 
more use would be made of operational and tactical airborne forces 
than in northern Finland, as the terrain and density of airfields of-
fered better conditions for this. The deployment of forces in northern 
Finland was assumed to be similar to that in Alternative A. 
The capacity of the ports in southwestern Finland was reck-
oned to be adequate for such an invasion, and it was calculated that, 
at least in theory, an aggressor would be able to unload about 135 
battalions of troops or about 270,000 tonnes of equipment per 24 
hours (sic).Yet, it was not expected that the invading force would be 
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particularly strong, however, as Finland was regarded as lying on the 
flank of the main thrust taking place in Central Europe.' 
In this alternative a substantial proportion of the available for-
mations would have been occupied in defending southwestern Fin-
land, so that it would have been necessary to manage with fewer in 
northern Finland. This meant that as it would have been impossible 
to determine the main axis of the enemy attack in advance, enough 
reserves would have had to be left with General Headquarters to 
cope with the situation. The most important battle zones would have 
been the Åland Islands, Hanko and the Rauma—Pori area, and it was 
only Åland that could have been abandoned, in which case the de-
fence positions to delay the enemy advance would have been built 
on the islands between Åland and the coast. If it was not possible to 
hold the coast and ports against an attack, the enemy would have 
had to be contained at the latest in a zone with its front line on the 
coast and rear a few kilometres inland. 
4.1.3. Alternative C—Sweden in alliance with the aggres-
sors66 
Alternative C would have been the most problematic of all for the 
Finns, since it would have presupposed that the aggressor had ac-
cess to the territory of Sweden and that the attack would have come 
from the Baltic Sea and through both Sweden and Norway. 
The Western powers' capacity to attack Finland would have im-
proved enormously if they had had access to Sweden, since the dan-
ger of a landing in the ports on the Gulf of Bothnia coast of Finland 
and an invasion across of the land frontier in the Tornio Valley would 
have been very much greater. 
The aggressor's objectives were assumed to be very much the 
same in as in alternative B, to influence Finnish attitudes towards 
the power blocks engaged in the war, to isolate the Soviet Baltic and 
Arctic Ocean Fleets, to tie up a proportion of the Soviet forces and 
to create a base for an offensive towards the northwestern parts of 
the Soviet Union. 
The immediate objectives of the attack in southwestern Fin- 
The basis for this estimate is not known. The figure, however, appears to be 
totally unrealistic as in 1950 the Finnish ports handled some 10 million tons 
of materiel per annum, see Merenkuluhallituksen asiak nro 37/Sottsto/711 d/ 
sal/10.11.1970, T 269651E3 sal, SArk. 
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land would likewise have been the same as in alternative B, but with 
greater emphasis on the role of the west-coast ports, as the principal 
aim of the offensive mounted from Sweden would have been to cut 
connections of the troops in the far north of Finland. The possibility 
of an amphibious landing attempt across the Gulf of Bothnia was a 
new threat, albeit a less probable one, evidently with the purpose of 
attacking either the troops operating in northern Finland or those in 
southern Finland from the rear. 
Estimation of the strength of the enemy forces was regarded as 
being still more difficult in this alternative, but it was evident that 
size of the force and its technical superiority would have been such 
that all the troops that could possibly be mobilized would have been 
needed for a successful defence. The chances would not have been 
very good with a fast deployment force alone. 
4.2. A brigade-based field army as the preparatory core 
for mobilization 
When President Paasikivi approved the proposal by the Command-
er-in-Chief of the Defence Forces for the commencement of mobili-
zation preparations and the drawing up of operational plans on 
March 1948, the preparations were to apply to a whole field army as 
well as the maximum deployment of 41,900 men permitted under 
the Paris Peace Treaty.61 Although the interpretation by which the 
restrictions imposed by the treaty would cease to apply in certain 
situations, so that full mobilization would be possible, was not un-
ambiguous, the conclusion was reached in all discussions and inter-
pretations up to 1950 that the provisions of the FCMA Treaty and 
the right of an independent state to defend its own territory against 
aggression justified the commencement of such preparations. Any 
decision on cessation of the restrictions under the agreement if the 
situation had demanded would have been purely in the hands of the 
Finnish political leadership.68 
Although a division-based field army had still appeared to be a 
suitable arrangement at the end of the Second World War, the situ-
ation had altered once the conditions for peace had been accepted, 
so that other alternatives had to be considered once new obligations 
and limitations applied.69 
The question of the wartime establishments came to the fore in 
1948, when the Committee on Wartime Establishments (määrävah- 
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vuustoimikunta) was set up. This body proposed that the country's 
wartime defence should be based on a wartime army that was or-
ganized into divisions as basic formations, while brigades would be 
needed as miniature formations for covering the mobilization, de-
fence against airborne attacks or amphibious landings, and mobile 
operations.70 
The first draft for the wartime composition of the army and pre-
liminary mobilization plan was completed in the Mobilization Divi-
sion of General Headquarters in February 1949. Commencement of 
this planning had been held up considerably by questions surround-
ing the interpretation of the existing agreements and disputes be-
tween General Headquarters and the Defence Revision Committee 
over the army's peacetime composition. The mobilization plan was 
further complicated by differences of opinion over the division of the 
country into military provinces and districts." 
The intention as far as mobilization was concerned was to cre-
ate a wartime army composed of both divisions and brigades, with 
fast deployment forces amounting to 174,000 men. This would have 
meant a total wartime strength of about 403,000 men. The aim was 
to form the 9 infantry brigades, 2 armoured brigades and 27 inde-
pendent battalions of the fast deployment forces within the peace-
time troops on the cadre principle. In the event of mobilization each 
military province would have been responsible for supplying one 
division, so that seven of these would have been formed in all.72 
The Operations Division, however, did not regard the Mobili-
zation Division's proposal as the only possible alternative in its dis-
cussions of July 1949, and simply labelled it Alternative A. Alongside 
this an Alternative B was drawn up in which the fast deployment 
forces were restricted to 41,900 men, as allowed for under the peace 
treaty, and mobilization would have entailed, in addition to these, 
the formation of 13 infantry brigades, one armoured brigade and 27 
independent battalions, giving a total army complement of 336,000 
men.73 
During the same year the Committee on Wartime Establish-
ments came to conclusion that the brigade would be a more flexible 
basic formation than the division, since a possible war would require 
the creation of a defence capability on all land and sea boundar-
ies and against airborne landings and a small number of divisions 
would not provide adequate flexibility over the whole country in this 
respect.74 Thus a decision in principle was taken towards the end of 
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1949 to the effect that the army would change over to an organi-
zation based entirely on brigades," the existing divisions being re-
tained just as long as it took the military provinces to transfer to the 
new wartime composition. The threat of a war between the Eastern 
and Western powers and Finland's obligations under various agree-
ments had demonstrated that the division was too heavy a forma-
tion for mobile operations.76 
4.3. Formation of the auxiliary complement (täydennys-
kokoonpano) 
When work began on drawing up the first defence plans on 4th Jan-
uary 1950, on the orders of the General Headquarters Operations 
Division, a plan was prepared for supplementing the peacetime 
complement of the Defence Forces to attain the maximum strength 
permitted under the Treaty of Paris, 41,900 men. This strength was 
referred to as the"auxiliary complement", or A-complement." 
The tasks of the A-complement were: 
- to guarantee the country's neutrality, 
- to maintain internal order and protect targets that were of 
economic or military importance to the country, and 
- to carry out military operations to repel any penetration of 
enemy forces into the country's territory.78 
The country was divided into five areas of operational respon-
sibility: the Southwestern Area of Responsibility (SWAR), Inland 
Area of Responsibility (IAR), northern Area of Responsibility (NAR), 
Uusimaa Area of Responsibility Region (UAR) and Ostrobothnia 
Area of Responsibility (ORR). The peacetime troops in each area and 
some troops in the various arms of the Defence Forces as laid down 
by General Headquarters were subordinated to the respective area 
commander. 
The order also set out operational tasks for each area of respon-
sibility. The Southwestern Area was to be prepared to transfer an 
infantry regiment and a field artillery battalion together with naval 
forces to the Aland Islands, to secure the local defences of the Hanko 
Peninsula and to seal of the borders of the leased peninsula of Pork-
kala. The Inland Area was to concentrate on protecting its railway 
junctions and all routes leading to Porkkala, and the northern Area 
was to protect the nodes in its transport network and its rail connec- 
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Figure 6. Division of Finland into areas of responsibility 
tion with the south and to make preparations to move some of its 
troops into northern Lapland. It was the task of the Uusimaa Area to 
defend the capital, Helsinki, and to protect and seal off the borders 
of the Porkkala Peninsula and the connections leading to it. Finally, 
the Ostrobothnia Area was to guard the ports of that coast and the 
important railway line running north. The Light Brigade stationed 
at Hämeenlinna was held in reserve by General Headquarters to 
be deployed as necessary. The area commanders were expected to 
include the Frontier Guard forces of their area in their operational 
plans, but there was no intention at that stage of involving the civil-
ian administration in the planning process.79 
The commanders of the Navy and Air Force also received plan-
ning duties of their own in connection with the establishment of 
the A-complement. The intention was that the Air Force should be 
directly subordinate operatively to the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Defence Forces in terms of the A-complement and should be re-
sponsible for the planning of air operations, anti-aircraft defence 
and air raid warning duties. These activities were to be dovetailed in 
with the planning carried out by the areas of responsibility. 
The main functions of the air force squadrons were to be recon-
naissance, fighter defence for certain important targets, aerial surveil-
lance of the national borders and of sea traffic, support for the army 
and naval forces and fighter cover for transport convoys in and out of 
the Åland Islands. It was to be possible to concentrate the majority of 
the fighter squadrons in different parts of the country as required.8° 
On transition to the A-complement the Commander of the 
Navy was to become inspector of the coastal defences and the coast-
al defence forces were to be placed under the commanders of the 
areas of responsibility, while the naval vessels on operational du-
ties would be subordinate to the Commander of the Defence Forces. 
The Navy was to draw up a plan for surveillance of the country's 
maritime boundaries, with the focus of attention in southwestern 
Finland, so that the deployment of ships in the area was geared to-
wards protecting Åland from a surprise attack and ensuring the safe 
transport of troops to the area. It was also important to guarantee 
the free and safe passage of commercial vessels and to protect the 
channels leading to the Porkkala base. The use of defensive mining 
in order to defend the country's neutrality was to be considered in a 
separate plan.81  
The Commander-in- Chief of the Defence Forces approved these 
plans with certain additions and alterations on 191'' June 1950.82 
As far as internal protection was concerned, the order was to 
reach agreement on cooperation between the military and civilian 
authorities. Arrangements were to be made for the protection of fac-
tories, large storehouses, railways and post offices in such a way that 
each would protect these with the personnel available. Within the 
border zone responsibility for such matters could also be delegated 
to the Frontier Guard. 
The transfer to this A-complement plan was a response to three 
estimated threats, and a separate area of responsibility was set up in 
General Headquarters with respect to each of these. The Inland Area 
clearly constituted a rear zone where attempts were made to take 
Soviet needs into account in the manner laid down in the FCMA 
Treaty and execution were highly confidential matters, as may be 
appreciated from the General Headquarters' directive that operation 
orders were to be seen only by the commander and chief of staff in 
the area concerned. Other officers were to see only those parts that 
applied to their own duties.83 
The internal defence instructions were standardized in Novem-
ber 1950 and the orders gathered together into one document. It was 
also at this point that the concept of"maintaining internal order and 
security"was coined. The tasks of the Defence Forces in this respect 
were defined as follows: 
- to perform duties of an internal nature requiring military 
measures as laid down by the legal government of the 
country, 
- to render assistance to the civilian authorities as required if 
police action were to prove insufficient for maintaining 
internal order and security, 
- to ensure free passage and communications in and out of 
the Soviet base at Porkkala in accordance with the peace 
treaty, and 
- to guarantee the continued functioning of the country's 
government and economic and business life and to protect 
sites of importance to the Defence Forces." 
There had been substantial differences of opinion between the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces and the Defence Revi-
sion Committee with regard to both the peacetime military division 
of the country and the wartime composition of the armed forces, 
and this had made operational planning much more difficult, as 
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there was no sound foundation on which the preparations could be 
based.85 
4.3.1. The wartime complement as a basis for a decentral-
ized mobilization system 
Although permission had been received from the President for the 
commencement of preparations for mobilization in 1948, no clear 
basis existed for planning such a system. It was only after a brigade-
based composition for the armed forces had been approved in June 
1950,81 a statute for the formation of military provinces and districts 
had been promulgated in January 1951 and a unanimous interpreta-
tion of the country's obligations under the FCMA Treaty had been 
reached that the way became clear for the commencement of mobi-
lization planning. 
The command structure for mobilization proved to be a difficult 
matter. Operational preparations were to be led by the command-
ers of the five areas of responsibility at their own peacetime head-
quarters. The General Headquarters, however, maintained direct 
control in matters of mobilization over the military provinces and 
the military districts that were under them. Thus only a coordination 
relationship prevailed between the military provinces and the com-
mand levels responsible for operational preparations.87 This meant 
that General Headquarters had too many instances directly under 
its control, as it were, and that coordination between the peacetime 
regional headquarters and the military provinces was felt to be ex-
trernely difficult." 
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS 
r------------ ------ --- ---~ 
FRONTIER AIR FORCE HQ 	NAVY HQ 
GUARD HQ 
DIVISIONAL HQ 	MILITARY 	INDEPENDENT 
PROVINCE HQ UNITS 
FRONTIER CONTINGENTS 	MILITARY 
DISTRICTS DISTRICT HQ 
Figure 7. Mobilization command structure 
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The mobilization of wartime troops had relied heavily on the 
Civil Guard organization in the 19305,89 and the military districts 
had been left without any fixed lower-level organization once the 
Civil Guard had been disbanded after war. Thus it was soon realized 
in the early 1950s that the headquarters of a military district was 
unable to carry out the mobilization in its geographically relatively 
large area without an adequate sub-organization responsible for ac-
tual execution. This led to the creation of a new command level be-
low the military district, known as the military area (sotilasalue), to 
be headed by a reserve officer who had achieved sufficient status in 
the civilian community. The military districts made preparations for 
their division into military areas during the first half of 1952.90 The 
military areas had several mobilization centres, which were respon-
sible for the actual execution of the mobilization. As early as March 
1950 there had been more than 200 of these centres throughout the 
country.91  
The aim was to raise the complement of the peacetime Defence 
Forces to its wartime level in three phases as demanded by the per-
ceived threat: first the A-complement, then a fast deployment force 
complement and finally a full wartime complement. The A-comple-
ment conformed to the maximum strength permitted under the Par-
is Peace Treaty, in addition to which some 11,000 persons (including 
over 9000 women) were to be employed in an air defence capacity 
under the air-raid precautions legislation and the police forces was 
to be increased in strength to 10,000 men in order to cope with vari-
ous guard and warden duties.92 The strength of the fast deployment 
forces, as confirmed on 22nd December 1950, was to be approximately 
320,000 persons. The plan was to create 15 brigades within the army, 
for which equipment was already available, while the Navy and Air 
Force were to be raised to their maximum strength and the Fron-
tier Guard was to be doubled in strength. The wartime complement, 
confirmed on 28th March 1951, was to be more or less 500,000 per-
sons, including 46,000 women. It was estimated that about 100,000 
persons would be exempted from service for one reason or another. 
This full complement would imply an increase in numbers in the 
army above all.93  
The formation of these troops was concentrated mostly in the 
more densely populated areas of the country, where people could 
be gathered rapidly at the mobilization centres for deployment in 
accordance with the operational plan. It is thus necessary to appreci- 
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ate the difference between the mobilization scheme and the opera-
tional plan for the deployment of the forces. This difference meant in 
practise that a brigade might be mobilized in Oulu, for instance, but 
might then by transported hundreds of kilometres north from there 
for its first mission under the operational plan, as part of the defence 
of the northernmost part of Lapland. 
4.4. National defence under the code name"Polttoaine® 
hankinta" 
4.4.1. Planning based on territorial defence and defence 
zones 
Once the framework required for operational planning purposes 
was completed in General Headquarters it was possible to issue 
a command for the commencement of work on national defence 
plans on 17th September 1951. After a period of intensive work on 
these plans, they were approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Defence Forces in an operation order issued on 13th June 1952 which 
was given the code name"Polttoainehankinta" (OpO-52, from here 
on).94 
This extensive order classified as top secret was more than a 
hundred pages in length and existed in only 15 copies, of which 
those in the possession of the chiefs of the Operations Division and 
Mobilization Division and the inspector of infantry, all within Gen-
eral Headquarters, were complete copies with all the appendices, 
while the others contained only those parts that were of relevance 
to the holder. The plans were drawn up for the event of an attack on 
Finland or on the Soviet Union through Finnish territory in accor-
dance with the three scenarios detailed above. The plans for the de-
ployment of troops were based on Alternative C, the least likely but 
most dangerous of the three. In simplified terms, the document was 
a defence plan for implementation in the event of an attack from the 
west of the kind that would constitute a clear indication for invoking 
Finland's obligations under the FCMA Treaty. 
The nature of warfare was regarded as having altered since the 
Second World War, for that it would be likely to affect the whole 
country in a more comprehensive manner than before. It was thus 
envisaged that hostilities would extend to the interior of the coun- 
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try and that the traditional division into a home front and a battle 
front would no longer apply. Also, the earlier assumption of a threat 
from the Soviet Union had now been replaced by the possibility of a 
threat from both east and west, so that the defence plan started out 
from the notion of territorial defence.95 This was in effect the first 
concept of national defence in which all the resources available over 
the whole country were to be mobilized in order to repel an attack, 
the regions being formed with a view to operational, economic and 
civil defence requirements. 
The decisive factors from the operational point of view were 
the extent of the threat to each region and factors related to military 
geography, while it was also important to preserve economically and 
logistically uniform regional units. In order to facilitate coordination 
and a centralized command with respect to the defence preparations 
made by different branches of the administration, every attempt was 
made to keep the administrative boundaries unchanged.96 
Under the orders concerning the main principles of this territo-
rial defence system issued in September 1951, each commander of 
an area of responsibility was in charge of the defence of his area in 
all situations. He would direct and supervise military and economic 
preparations for mobilization and see that the necessary civil de-
fence precautions had been taken, and he would have practically 
all the defence forces present in the area under his command, the 
exceptions being the Air Force and Navy units that were under the 
direct General Headquarters command. The commander of an area 
of responsibility was also authorized to take all necessary measures 
for the defence of his area independently should communications 
with the supreme command be cut off.97 
OpO-52 served to integrate all the previous ideas on the de-
ployment of the Defence Forces in the various complements: 
- peacetime complement 
- auxiliary complement 
- fast deployment complement 
- full wartime complement. 
The peacetime complement would now apply to the perfor-
mance of duties of an internal nature, given that the auxiliary com-
plement was not deemed necessary, while the auxiliary complement 
of troops would be used primarily for the maintenance of order and 
protection of the country's neutrality. The fast deployment comple-
ment then represented the maximum strength of the armed forces 
43 
to be deployed for safeguarding neutrality, being determined by 
the quantity of equipment already available or obtainable rapidly, 
and would imply mobilization of about half of the country's poten-
tial ground force strength and the placement of the Navy and Air 
Force on full strength. The wartime complement then implied the 
full strength of the Defence Forces that could be mobilized in the 
event of war, and could be achieved either at once or incrementally, 
through the above stages. 
Although the defence planning that began in September 1951 
had based on the concept of five areas of responsibility that were 
subordinate to General Headquarters, the division had altered as 
planning proceeded, so that when the actual orders were issued 
in June 1952 wartime preparations were based on four areas, the 
Southwestern Area of Responsibility and Uusimaa Area of Respon-
sibility being combined into one Southern Area of Responsibility.`' 
According to the basic concept of operations, the defence 
against an enemy attack would be mounted all over the country, be-
ginning in the border areas. If Finland was able to remain neutral or 
outside the sphere of hostilities the troops that were deployed along 
the borders would be used for guarding the border. 
In order to add depth to the defences, a series of successive 
defence zones were to be set up. The troops were to be deployed 
initially so that they were concentrated most in the outer zone of 
their area of responsibility. In addition, the commanders of the areas 
of responsibility would take charge of the defence of their coasts, 
with the coastal forces under their command. In order to contain any 
surprise breakthrough and create the possibility for a counter-attack, 
an inner defence zone was also to be created, preparations for which 
were to be made by the Inland Area of Responsibility in conjunction 
with the other areas. 
Border patrolling formed an entity of its own which was con-
nected with the other defence preparations. The principal aim of this 
patrolling was to prevent illegal crossings of the border. The com-
manders of the areas of responsibility were expected to make plans 
for this in collaboration with the Frontier Guard during peacetime in 
order to integrate their activities.99 
The Frontier Guard, could be ordered in its entirety or in part 
to step up its surveillance of the national frontiers as required, and 
it could also be subordinated totally or in part to the Defence Forces 
by means of a separate order. This transfer to intensified surveillance 
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implied an increase in the Frontier Guard's own duty personnel and 
the drafting of Defence Force personnel to these functions as neces-
sary. The aim was to double the peacetime strength of the Frontier 
Guard force. 
The intention was that the Frontier Guard should retain its own 
peacetime name and duties even at times of war or the threat of 
war, except in Lapland, where it would be divided into the Western 
Lapland Frontier Guard and Eastern Lapland Frontier Guard. The 
doubling in manpower was to take place on advancing from the A-
complement to the fast deployment complement.100 The organiza-
tion's main tasks at times of war or the threat of war would continue 
to be patrolling and surveillance of the national borders, and it was 
expected to be capable of repelling weak minor local attacks. 
Brigade Armoured 
Brigade 
Corps HQ Independent 
Battalion 
NAR 2/6/8 - -/2/3 2/3/3 
SAR 2/6/9 - -/1/2 2/4/4 
IAR -/1/3 - - -/3/3 
OAR -/l/2 - - 1/3/3 
Reserves 2/4/8 1/1/2 -/1/2 - 
6/18/30 1/1/2 -/4/7 5/13/13 
Explanation: Auxilliary Complement/Fast Deployment Forces/Full Wartime 
Forces. 
Note: Three Jaeger Brigades are included to the total amount of Brigades. 
Figure 8. The order of battle according to OpO-52 
4.4.2. Defence of the Northern Area of Responsibility 
(NAR) 
The plan for the defence of the Northern Area of Responsibility in 
the face of threats of the three alternative kinds and in all states 
of preparedness was a complicated matter. The idea of a series of 
consecutive defence zones and the deployment of troops in accor-
dance with these can nevertheless be simplified to the point where 
it is possible to form some sort of mental picture of the situation. 
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Some of the available troops were to be used to repel the enemy im-
mediately at the border, the focus of attention for this being beside 
the roads leading in from Norway and the Soviet Union in northern 
Lapland, and if Sweden had allied itself with the Western powers 
the defence of the frontier along the Tornio Valley would have been 
a further point of emphasis from the outset. The important thing 
was to prevent all attacks, patrolling and destruction that might be 
perpetrated at the Jäniskoski power station and the Petsamo nickel 
mine in the Soviet Union by penetrating through Finnish territory. 
The majority of the troops available for this would be assembled 
in southern Lapland, where their task would be to maintain control 
over the rail and road connections in the area that then led over the 
Soviet border, and also the airports and industrial installations. They 
were also expected to protect the rear of the troops already in the 
north by preventing landings on the coast of the Bothnian Bay. The 
area also formed a crucial element in the operational alternatives, 
and was strategically well-placed, as all the roads running north-
south converged here, so that troops could be concentrated in the 
area and dispatched in whatever direction was appropriate in the 
given political or military situation.101 The southernmost level of the 
Northern Area of Responsibility was the defence zone that crossed 
Finland at its narrowest point, for it was here that the troops had the 
task of preventing the enemy from penetrating into the Inland Area 
and gaining control of the railway connections there. It would be in 
this zone at the latest that counter-attacks would be mounted with 
General Headquarters reserves in order to destroy the enemy. If the 
troops became involved in a delaying action between these defence 
zones particular attention should be paid to the maintaining of ac-
tive guerrilla warfare. 
4.4.3. The Ostrobothnia Area of Responsibility (OAR)102  
The intention was to develop the Headquarters of the Ostrobothnia 
Military Province into the Ostrobothnia Group Headquarters to take 
command of this area of responsibility as the level of readiness was 
increased. 
It was the task of this area of responsibility to repel enemy at-
tacks across the Gulf of Bothnia from Sweden if that country were to 
be used by an aggressor. The front line of defence ran approximate-
ly along the coast, including the larger islands, and the emphasis 
was to be on protecting the ports and railway junctions. The troops 
were also required to be prepared to repel an attack from the north, 
through the northern Area of Responsibility. If the Ostrobothnia 
area itself was not under attack, these forces were to constitute part 
of the General Headquarters reserve and could be deployed else-
where at short notice. 
4.4.4. The Southern Area of Responsibility (SAR)103 
The Southern Area of Responsibility formed three consecutive, 
closely associated defence zones: 
- the Åland defence zone, comprising the Åland Islands and 
the outer parts of the southwestern archipelago, 
- the Archipelago defence zone, the front line of which ran 
from Helsinki through Hanko to the islands off Turku and 
from there as far as Isokari and Pyhämaa, and 
- the Coastal defence zone, the front line of which followed 
the coast from Helsinki to the west-coast ports. 
The idea was that the Southern Area of Responsibility should 
employ the majority of its troops to repel enemy attacks in the Ar-
chipelago and Coastal defence zones, the main effort being on the 
Hanko Peninsula and the Helsinki area. The Coastal defence zone 
nevertheless marked the last line at which any enemy invasion was 
to be repulsed, and large-scale counter attacks by the reserves of the 
General Headquarters would be launched. Under Alternative C it 
would also be necessary to prepare to defend the islands in the Gulf 
of Bothnia and on the west coast of mainland Finland. The Soviet 
base at Porkkala also came into these plans, in that the main over-
land connections and sea channels leading to the base were to be 
protected under all conditions. 
It was planned that the Southern Area of Responsibility should 
assemble an army corps in the Hanko-Kemiö area and a brigade in 
the Helsinki area and that one more brigade should be subordinated 
to each at the stage of a declaration of war.104 The defence of the 
west coast should be primarily in the hands of the coastal artillery, 
with mobile reserves in the form of one Jaeger battalion.10' A brigade 
should be concentrated in the Åland zone at the fast deployment 
phase, and an army corps consisting of two brigades in the war-
time complement.106 The Southern Area of Responsibility planned to 
have a Jaeger brigade and an Infantry brigade as reserves, prepared 
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to mount a counter-attack in the event of an enemy landing in the 
vulnerable strip of land in Western Uusimaa.107 
4.4.5. The Inland Area of Responsibility and reserves un-
der the supreme command108 
The Inland Area of Responsibility was regarded above all as a hinter-
land in which the majority of the country's munitions factories and 
the supreme command's supply depots were located. In addition, 
most of the reserves under General Headquarters command were 
to be grouped in this area before being concentrated in their first 
operational assignment. 
In the event of an attack on Finland it would be the task of this 
area to repel any attempted invasion from the Gulf of Finland, de-
stroy any airborne assaults that attempted an incursion and secure 
the critical Soviet sea and land connections with Porkkala. In addi-
tion, it would be important to stop and destroy any surprise enemy 
breakthrough from the west at the point of the innermost defence 
zone. 
The main reserves at the disposal of General Headquarters in 
the A-complement were the 5 and 6 Brigades, to be formed in the 
Inland Area of Responsibility, and the Light Brigade. These were 
prepared to be concentrated in northern Finland, to strengthen the 
defences and launch counter-attacks into the north of Lapland, or to 
the areas north of Helsinki, where they could be used to strength-
en the coastal defence zone, mount counterattacks and protect the 
capital. The aim was to leave the Light Brigade initially in the area in 
which it had been formed, around 100 kilometres from the capital, 
from where it was to be prepared to go into action primarily around 
Helsinki or Hanko. 
The areas of troop concentrations in southern Finland at the 
fast deployment stage and from the time of preparation for war on-
wards had not altered relative to earlier plans, although their num-
bers had increased greatly. In northern Finland, however, the plan 
was now to concentrate reserves belonging to the supreme com-
mand to strengthen the main defence zone in southern Lapland and 
to mount counter-attacks into this zone. In addition, preparations 
were to be made to use the reserves to reinforce the more distant 
lines of defence. 
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Figure 9. Planned concentration areas of fast deployment forces 
(Op0-52) 
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4.4.6. Air defence109  
The task of the air defence system, consisting of air squadrons, air-
raid warning personnel and anti-aircraft artillery, was to intercept 
the enemy's aerial attacks, and detract from its fire-power. Under 
wartime conditions the use of air power was to be subordinated to 
this overall air defence system, with the aim of attaining a uniform 
command for the Air Force, concentrating its use for the repulsion of 
air attacks over the whole country and creating a basis for supportive 
co-operation with the army formations. 
The air defences of the four areas of responsibility, under the 
commanders of these areas, were to consist of anti-aircraft troops 
and air defence troops deployed for the protection of certain po-
tential targets. As the level of readiness was stepped up, the Com-
mander of the Air Force would become an inspector of air defence at 
the General Headquarters and commander of the air sqaudrons and 
aerial surveillance troops. The country was divided into four flight 
districts for air command purposes: 
- Northern flight district (NED) 
- Ostrobothnia flight district (OFD) 
- Southern flight district (SFD) 
- Inland flight district (IFD) 
The boundaries of these districts corresponded to those of the 
earlier air defence regions, so that they did not correspond entirely to 
the operational areas of responsibility, but it was possible to change 
them as the level of readiness was increased. 
Each flight district was to have a wartime complement of one 
air brigade, the commander of which was also to be in charge of the 
air surveillance troops and those parts of the Air Force assigned to 
him in each situation and was to act as commander of air defence in 
the area of responsibility. Each flight district was to have one or two 
combat control centres for the conduct of air combat operations. 
The Air Force was to have four squadrons of fighter aircraft and 
one of transport aircraft at its disposal at the A-complement stage. 
Thereafter it had no separate fast deployment complement, but was 
to move directly to the wartime stage, at which there would be four-
teen squadrons of fighter aircraft and a transport detachment formed 
from the transport squadron. A reconnaissance squadron and two 
night fighter squadrons would also be created at this stage. 
The concentration of the air arm was to be determined by the 
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Commander of the Air Force, by issuing assignments to the air bri-
gades, placing the necessary number of squadrons under them and 
giving orders to the formations under his command. In the case of 
Alternative A six fighter squadrons could be based in the northern 
Area of Responsibility, three in the Southern Area of Responsibil-
ity, three in the Ostrobothnia Area of Responsibility and two in the 
Inland Area of Responsibility. In the event of a threat from the direc-
tion of the Baltic Sea as well, there could be five squadrons in action 
in the Southern Area of Responsibility. 
The general tasks of the air arm were connected with surveil-
lance of Finnish airspace and the prevention of incursions, also de- 
fence against air attacks, aerial reconnaissance, air strikes and the 
protection of land or naval operations. In addition, each flight dis-
trict had tasks of its own in relation to aerial reconnaissance and the 
protection of railways, industries, population centres and transport 
convoys. 
The Air Force Commander would be responsible for national 
air surveillance and the commanders of the air brigades for surveil- 
lance in their own areas. The intention was to create an air surveil-
lance network of 36 sectors covering the whole country, backed up 
by a radar network. 
The anti-aircraft artillery was to play an important role in the 
overall air defence system. As the Defence Forces moved to the 
A-complement stage the peacetime anti-aircraft troops would be 
formed into anti-aircraft units charged with defending the main 
potential targets of importance to the country, such as the capital, 
Helsinki, and the principal railway junctions. The units stationed in 
the Inland Area of Responsibility were to serve as reserves under the 
General Headquarters for deployment in the south of the country if 
necessary. 
The intended command structure for anti-aircraft activities was 
to consist of 15 regimental command posts, 21 heavy artillery bat- 
talion command posts and 28 artillery battalion command posts. In 
addition to the anti-aircraft companies that formed organic parts of 
the brigades, there were to be 57 heavy anti-aircraft batteries, 84 
light batteries and ten anti-aircraft battalions, together with a num- 
ber of railway-mounted anti-aircraft units.110 It was planned to use 
the heavy batteries chiefly to protect urban targets and the main 
railway stations, while the light artillery and anti-aircraft battalions 
were with only a few exceptions to be placed at the disposal of the 
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commanders of the areas of responsibility for the protection of the 
combat troops and their support lines. 
In actual fact the Air Force plans were quite unrealistic, as was 
widely acknowledged in Air Force circles. Although trends in equip-
ment supplies merit a chapter of their own in this work, it should be 
mentioned at this point that the Air Force did not in practice have 
the capacity to discharge the duties assigned to it in this plan. Its 
fleet of aircraft was still based on the Messerschmitt ME 109s that it 
had used during the Second World War, of which it had the maxi-
mum number in operation that was permitted under the Treaty of 
Paris.111  The Air Force did not possess a single jet aircraft. 
4.4.7. The Navy and coastal artillery'12 
With an increase in the state of alert of the armed forces the Naval 
Commander would have the same forces under him as in peacetime 
but reinforced in numbers in accordance with the A-complement. 
Like the Air Force, the Navy would achieve its maximum strength 
mainly at the Fast Deployment phase, and only a few extra units 
would be formed on transfer to a wartime complement. The plan 
was to divide the naval forces in action at the fast deployment stage 
into a general force and local forces assigned to three maritime dis-
tricts. 
On transfer to the A-complement the main additions would 
be made to the general forces while the majority of the local units 
would be formed at the fast deployment stage. The numbers of ves-
sels available at these two phases are set out in the table below: 
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Local forces 
General Archipelago Gulf of Gulf of 
Unit forces Maritime Bothnia Finland 
District Maritime Maritime Total 
District District 
A/Fast A/Fast A/Fast A/Fast 
(War) (War) (War) (War) 
HQ Flotilla 1/1 -/2 -/- -/1 4 
Escort 
squadron 1/1 1/1 -/1 -/1 4 
(sqn) 
Patrol boat 1/1 -/- 0.5/- 0.5/- 2 sgn 
Patrol /1 / / / 1 vessels sqn 
Fast gunboat 1/2 -/- -/- -/- 2 sqn 
Gun vessel / /1 / / 1 sqn 
Minelayer 1/1 -/1 0.5/1 0.5/1 4 sqn 
Minesweeper 2/2 2/4 1.5/2 2/3 11 sqn 
Transport 1/2 /- -/1 3 vessel sqn 
Transport 1/4 -/1 0.5/2 7 sqn 
Figure 10. Principal naval units. 
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In response to an operation order from General Headquarters, 
the Naval Headquarters drew up its own plan for naval deployment 
by the end of 1951, under which the best vessels in terms of perfor-
mance were to be assigned to the general forces under the direct 
command of the Naval Commander.1' 
The tasks of the general forces were focused most of all on the 
Archipelago Sea, especially the area around the Aland Islands. The 
first and most important task was to protect the neutrality of Åland 
until such time as army units could be moved there, and to mine 
primarily the Archipelago Sea. The general forces should also be ca-
pable of protecting the troop movements to Aland and commer-
cial shipping via Aland until it reached Swedish waters. Once the 
ground forces had grouped on Åland the task of the naval general 
forces was to be prepared to prevent infringements of the islands' 
neutrality and to repel any attacks on the Åland or Hanko areas and 
the intervening defence zone.114 
The objective in all defensive encounters in the area between 
Åland and the south-west coast of Finland was to close the sea area 
by defensive sea mining and use artillery fire to prevent the enemy 
from penetrating into the southwestern archipelago. If the situation 
permitted, the general forces were also to attempt to mount an of-
fensive against any enemy naval vessels operating around Åland 
and to mine the routes that they were using."' 
Defensive minelaying operations played a key role in the naval 
operations. Mines were to be laid in accordance with the perceived 
threat, as a defensive measure at the fast deployment stage and with 
an increase in intensity as the threat of attack grew, although some 
of the mining was planned to take place only upon the commence-
ment of hostilities. The principal aim of the defensive mining was to 
prevent a surprise occupation of the main ports, with emphasis on 
those of Åland and southwestern Finland. As the numbers of mines 
required would be in excess of those held in stock, mining would be 
intensified only in accordance with the prevailing perceived threat. 
In all cases it was to be subject to a specific order from the Naval 
Commander, and each operation was to be completed within 2-6 
days, depending on the area concerned.116 
The commanders of the maritime districts were to be respon-
sible for coordinating naval activities with the plans and operations 
specific to their military areas of responsibility. The maritime districts 
were to support the area of responsibility and carry out the tasks 
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assigned to them by the higher command levels, so that their main 
duties were: 
- to maintain the security of the shipping channels, 
- to direct, inspect and protect shipping in Finnish waters, 
and in international waters if separately commanded to do so, 
- mobile surveillance of the sea areas, 
- defensive mining, 
- to support the areas of responsibility in repulsing attacks 
and infringements of neutrality, 
- to perform transport functions in the areas of responsibility 
as required, and 
- to maintain the naval forces located in their area. 
The Gulf of Finland Maritime District sea area comprised the 
coast of the Inland Area of Responsibility and that of the Southern 
Area east of Porkkala together with sea traffic passing Porkkala. Its 
headquarters was that of the Helsinki naval base. It was to be par-
ticularly responsible for the safety of the shipping channels and sea 
traffic in and out of the Porkkala base, and also for routes passing by 
Porkkala and directed towards the south coast of the Gulf of Finland. 
In terms of defence against possible attacks, the emphasis was to be 
on the Helsinki area. 
The Archipelago Maritime District corresponded to the South-
ern Area of Responsibility with the exception of Porkkala and the 
coastal strip to the east of it. The headquarters was that of the Turku 
naval base. Again it was to be particularly responsible for the safety 
of shipping channels and sea traffic from Porkkala through the Ar-
chipelago Sea to Åland and the Gulf of Bothnia and for the coastal 
routes leading north through the Bothnian Sea, but it was also to 
take charge of the transportation of troops to Åland and the mainte-
nance of their supply lines. The emphasis as far as the protection of 
neutrality and defence against aggression was to be on the Hanko 
area and the Archipelago defence zone. 
The Ostrobothnia sea area comprised the coast of the Os-
trobothnia and northern Areas of Responsibility, the headquarters 
being that of the Ostrobothnia Maritime Frontier Guard. The prin-
cipal task was to ensure the safety of the sea channels and protect 
shipping to the west. It was also to arrange for the transportation of 
supplies to the north by sea in the event of the rail connections be-
ing severed. 
As the modernization of the Finnish Navy was postponed to 
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the 1960s for economic reasons, the static coastal artillery batteries 
occupied a particularly important role in the coastal defences. This 
powerful element owed its origins to the powerful defence system 
created by the Russians along the Gulf of Finland coast at the very 
beginning of the century, mostly with possible German aggression 
in mind and for the purpose of protecting St. Petersburg."' When 
Finland became independent the majority of the fortresses in its area 
and the coastal artillery batteries located in them were left in the 
hands of the Finns, and these batteries were exploited to the full 
during the Second World War, becoming a significant factor in the 
defence of the south coast alongside defensive mining of the sea 
areas. 
The new plan for deployment of fixed coastal artillery batter-
ies approved by the Commander of the Defence Forces in 1954 was 
based on three phases, units to be formed at the A-complement 
phase, a Wartime-1 phase and a Wartime-2 phase, where the War-
time-1 phase could be implemented rapidly and with relatively little 
expenditure, while the wartime-2 phase called for new building and 
would thus be expensive and slow to implement. The emphasis in 
both wartime groupings was to be on the areas around Helsinki and 
Hanko, with a number of heavy coastal artillery batteries concen-
trated on the protection of the main channels leading to each. 118 
4.4.8. Improvements to the plan 
By the end of 1952 the process of operational planning that had 
commenced a few years earlier had reached the stage where a rea-
sonably practicable outline plan for the defence of Finland was in 
existence, although its details were known only to the upper ech-
elons at General Headquarters, Naval and Air Force Headquarters 
and in the Areas of Responsibility. 
Preparations for the A-complement had advanced the furthest, 
whereas the planning of fast deployment forces and wartime forces 
that were in excess of the maximum strength permitted under the 
Treaty of Paris was still in its initial stages. The duties involved in 
the mobilization of such troops were preliminarily defined in May 
1953,119 when General Headquarters distributed "exercise mobi-
lization books" which corresponded to the actual force structure 
but represented a convenient means of circumventing the Treaty of 
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Paris for purposes of planning mobilization and preparing defence 
plans.720 The same scheme was employed for constructing the plans 
for wartime army corps and brigades, the activities being disguised 
as exercises designed to maintain the professional capabilities of the 
soldiers, for fnstance.121  
The plans very soon had to be revised, however, as the new 
peacetime complement of the Defence Forces, which had been under 
dispute for eight years, finally came into law on 111 December 1952. 
This meant that the traditional infantry regiments were replaced by 
brigades and the units and garrisons were either reduced in size or 
disbanded.122 These changes affected not only the A-complement 
but also most significantly the plans for maintaining internal order 
and security. New principles for this were laid down in July 1953 by 
means of an order that carried the code name"Aluetuotanto".123 
The command structure required under this new definition of 
the maintaining of general order and security conformed to that laid 
down in the new operational plan, in that the commanders of the 
areas of responsibility were in charge of all measures taken in their 
areas, which were in turn divided into smaller sub-areas for this pur-
pose in accordance with the boundaries of the military provinces and 
military districts. This meant that the chief of each military district 
was responsible for all the preparation to be made in that district. A 
sentry battalion consisting of a company from each constituent mili-
tary area, together with one unit from the reserves, would be set up 
in each district at the initial stage of raising the level of alert. 
The targets of national importance that were to be protected 
were classified into five levels of significance for the country's war 
effort in order to ensure uniform and comprehensive preparations 
over the whole country. The intention was to use Defence Force 
sentry units to protect mainly the forces' own installations, while 
the police and guards from the organizations concerned should be 
responsible for the others. The plans for the areas of responsibility 
were completed by the end of 1953.124 
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5.1. The return of Porkkala - revision of the operational 
plans 
The departure of the Russians from the Porkkala base in January 
1956 altered the whole perspective of Finnish military policy and led 
to a thorough revision of the operational plans that had been drawn 
up in the early part of the decade. In addition, the highly complex 
command structure that the plans had required called for partial re-
vision and updating. 
In the first place, the return of Porkkala left a gap in Finland's 
coastal defences. The Frontier Guard station at Porkkala was closed 
once the Russians had left, and in March 1956 General Headquar- 
ters ordered the inspector of maritime defences and the Naval Com-
mander to plan defence arrangements for the restored area. The aim 
was to locate the Helsinki naval base and the 2°d Flotilla of the Finn-
ish navy there and also to re-draw the boundaries of the coastal ar-
tillery contingents and maritime districts.125 
The basic General Headquarters operation orders that re-
mained in force until the mid-1960s were drawn up in 1956-57, for 
although some details were updated in the course of the years, no 
entirely new orders were issued until the changeover to a territorial 
defence system. In fact, it was not so much a matter of drawing up 
new plans as of adapting and improving the existing ones. There 
were altogether four orders that standardized the procedures and 
steered all the planning operations:126 
- The order on defensive preparations (11th February 1956), 
which laid down guidelines for raising the readiness consis-
tent with the tasks of the Defence Forces.127 
- The order regarding protection of the nation's neutrality 
(12th December 1956), which defined the measures to be 
taken for this purpose.128 
- The order on the maintenance of general order and secu-
rity (15th June 1957), which defined the duties for which 
the Defence Forces were to be responsible or in which they 
were obliged to participate. This was mainly a matter of the 
protection of military installations and the provision of as- 
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sistance to the civilian authorities in the maintenance of 
law and order and the protection of sites of national signifi-
cance.129 
The order on national defence (20th December 1957), which 
defined the tasks of the Defence Forces with respect to an 
attack on the nation.130 
5.2. The military threat scenario and points of departure 
for strategic defence 
The strategic threat scenario of the 1950s was one in which it was 
envisaged that NATO forces might penetrate deep into Finnish ter-
ritory, although it was concluded in a General Headquarters opera-
tion order of 1957 that Western military resources were insufficient 
for an extensive overland operation in northern Europe. 
From a military point of view the main areas of interest had not 
changed greatly. The points of departure for estimating the exist-
ing threats continued to be the north, the south-west and the nar-
row part of the Gulf of Bothnia. The possible threat from the Soviet 
Union in the east was still not treated as a topic in its own right, 
although the content of the threat estimate had altered to the extent 
that mention was made of possible Soviet action against Finland in 
the event of war between the East and West.131  
Alternative A entailed a threat focused on northern Finland 
to the extent that it would be possible in the south to concentrate 
mostly on maintaining surveillance of the borders in order to protect 
the country's neutrality and on protection for major installations. A 
large-scale Western offensive eastwards from northern Norway in 
the Arctic Ocean area was not considered possible, at least in the 
initial stages of a war,132  as it was assumed that Norway would con-
centrate on defending the Skibotn-Narvik area. The initiative for 
hostilities was thought likely to come from the Soviet Union, which 
the Finns estimated would have the best chances of mounting an 
attack westwards with its large ground forces. But whichever party 
might open fire first, it would be essential for Finland to maintain 
control over northern Lapland by all available means so that there 
would be clear grounds for remaining neutral. 
In Alternative B the situation on the Norwegian boundary was 
assumed to be the same as in Alternative A, but the Western allies 
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were now assumed to be capable of entering the Baltic Sea via the 
Straits of Denmark. Given the existence of the Warsaw Pact, NATO 
could be expected to have less forces in the Baltic than its Eastern 
counterpart, so that any offensive against Finland was likely to be 
restricted at the early stages to reconnaissance and commando raids 
and the use of submarines along the coast. Nevertheless, although 
no major landing was to be expected at the early stages, preparations 
should be made for such an eventuality or for a large-scale incursion 
by airborne troops. Åland would be in a crucial position as far as the 
defence of the nation's neutrality was concerned, while preparations 
should be made to repel possible landings on the Hanko Peninsula 
and in the area between the Porkkala Peninsula and Helsinki.133 
In Alternative C the situation on the Norwegian border and in 
the Baltic Sea was taken to be as in B above, but with the additional 
assumption that Sweden had had to abandon its policy of neutral- 
ity and ally itself with the West. This policy was regarded as so reli-
able, however, that the whole Alternative C was deemed extremely 
improbable in the existing political situation. If it had come about, it 
would have entailed coordinated defence against amphibious land-
ings with associated airborne operations along the southern parts of 
the Finnish west coast. 134 
Although the chances of a powerful NATO assault on Finland 
by land and sea at the early stage in a conflict were regarded as mini- 
mal, the threat of an air attack was taken far more seriously, as it was 
estimated that NATO might well wish to mount an offensive against 
the Soviet Union via Finnish airspace, and even hostilities aimed at 
Finland itself were regarded as a probability, including the threat of 
extensive bombing at the initial stage in order to attain certain stra-
tegic goals. 
It was the general part of the 1958 Field Regulations that intro-
duced the term"strategic defence"into Finnish parlance, to indicate 
the use of ground, naval and air forces to prevent a possible enemy 
from capturing areas that were vital to the continuity of the country's 
independence, its own military operations or the livelihood of its cit-
izens and the protection of the population and community functions 
that were essential to the continuation of resistance. A crucial role in 
this was seen to be played by the maintenance of communications 
with the outside world.135 
The idea of vital areas that was underlined in these Field Regu-
lations gained more concrete form in a new appreciation in 1960, 
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when a core area was defined for defence purposes, comprising the 
area in which the majority of the population lived, the majority of 
recruitment activities took place and the majority of the nation's 
agricultural land and industrial production was located. The area of 
southern and central Finland was to be defended at all costs. In ad-
dition, a land connection with Sweden was to be retained for as long 
as possible.13' 
The point of departure was defence of the whole country. This 
was to be especially resolute in the case of the core area, in which 
the aggressor should be given no foothold. Outside the core area 
delaying tactics were to be adopted in the case of an overwhelming 
opposing force. Only the essential minimum of troops should be 
assigned to other threatened areas such as northern Finland, Aland 
or the south-west at the initial stages. The majority of the troops 
should be concentrated on defending the core—and this was to in-
clude the use of troops in an easterly direction, troops that would be 
regarded as reserves with respect to the above directions of princi-
pal threat. It was admitted that stringent requirements were placed 
upon Finland's intelligence organizations by its geographical posi-
tion between two major alliances.137 The definition of the core area 
for defence purposes evidently remained unchanged throughout the 
19605.138 
5.3. Improvements in the command structure and the 
speed of mobilization 
Although the general outlines of the mobilization system had been 
brought to some degree of readiness in the early 1950s, there was 
general dissatisfaction with the system and its performance. The 
greatest drawbacks lay in the complex command structure and slow 
execution of the system. 
Mobilization preparations were hampered and partly prevented 
by the fact that the planners had not been allowed to contact the ci-
vilian authorities on matters connected with mobilization. This had 
been possible only in the case of basic preparations for the A-com-
plement, that allowed for in the Paris Peace Treaty. This restriction on 
collaboration nevertheless made it very difficult to plan mobilization 
centres, arrange for local purchases of equipment and supplies, plan 
the requisitioning of vehicles and ships and prepare various sectors 
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of the community for the eventuality of war.139 
In spite of these difficulties, personnel eligible for call-up had 
been apportioned to the units to be mobilized. The problem simply 
lay in inspecting and maintaining these placements. 
A further problem concerned the plans to issue the new troops 
with equipment from the Defence Forces' stores or from material 
purchased locally,140 for although the central depots had internal 
plans for delivering the material, the question of decentralizing the 
war stores to military districts was still under consideration. The 
need for locally acquired material had been calculated for the vari-
ous categories of troops separately and the main sources had been 
traced, but the planning and preparations had not yet advanced to 
the level of details because consultations outside the Defence Forces 
themselves were forbidden. 
Industrial preparations for mobilization had only been planned 
in a preliminary manner, and as nothing was known of the person-
nel and transportation requirements of society at large, the planning 
was based on an inadequate foundation. Similarly the preparation of 
mobilization centres (perustamiskeskus) had been carried as far as 
was possible without direct consultations with the civilian authori-
ties. 
The slow pace of mobilization was also felt to be a problem, 
especially since a surprise attack was still regarded as being the most 
plausible threat. The General Headquarters Mobilization Division 
estimated that mobilization would require a preparation time of sev-
eral weeks or even months)' 
The command structure for mobilization had been reviewed in 
1956 to the extent that the military provinces had been subordinated 
to the peacetime divisions and the division headquarters had been 
ordered to supervise the mobilization preparations of certain units 
and departments that had remained subordinated to General Head-
quarters. The aim of the new command arrangements was to make 
the preparation for mobilization more uniform throughout.142 
The mobilization command structure remained unchanged 
from that time onwards until 1966. Although these arrangements 
simplified the work of the General Headquarters, they made the 
situation more difficult as far as the divisional headquarters were 
concerned, in that the 2 Division, for instance, had no less than 52 
subordinates. 
Training for the main categories of staff involved in mobiliza- 
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tion was extended only in the early 1960s, training on this basis be-
ing commenced in 1964. Since the storage of equipment had been 
concentrated in the central depots of the three branches of the armed 
forces from the end of the war onwards, the decentralization of the 
stores and distribution of the equipment in the event of mobiliza-
tion was likely to be slow and complicated. The first decentralization 
to the military districts had therefore been set in motion in 1956, 
although in practice it was not implemented until the early 1960s, 
when the military districts received new storage space.143 
Under the new definitions of Defence Force tasks issued by the 
Defence Council in 1962 the veil of secrecy over mobilization plans 
was lifted slightly, but General Headquarters still ordered prepara-
tions to continue in the form of implementation exercises for the 
various troops and command levels.144 
5.4. Protection of neutrality 
Since the greatest threat to Finnish independence was perceived to 
lie in a surprise attack, the basis for mobilization was taken to be 
a plan for the creation of a defence force with the same capabili-
ties as had existed throughout the war. The restoration of the leased 
Porkkala area to Finland in 1956 nevertheless provided a much more 
credible starting point for maintaining the country's policy of neu-
trality, and increasing emphasis came to be placed on a long-term 
political crisis, possibly with violations of this neutrality, as a lower 
level of threat than actual war.145 
In a crisis of this kind it was essential for the Defence Forces to 
be able to carry out the measures required to protect the country's 
neutrality with their peacetime complement, reinforced at most to 
the level permitted under the Treaty of Paris, i.e. the A-complement. 
If these forces were still insufficient it would be possible to obtain 
government permission to call up more troops as the situation re-
quired, including the creation of a separate neutrality surveillance 
force in the case of a prolonged crisis.146 Troops could only be formed 
in such a situation, however, up to the point where this began to 
interfere with the economy and the smooth functioning of society at 
large. In fact General Headquarters issued orders for the creation of 
such a neutrality surveillance force in 1956.'4' 
These orders applied to all branches of the armed forces. The 
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intention was to establish six brigades along with other necessary 
arms and services in the army, mostly on the cadre principle within 
the existing garrisons, enlisting the two youngest age groups of re-
serves. The preparations were to be headed by the commanders of 
the peacetime units in collaboration with the head of the region's 
military district. In practice this meant that some of the duties in-
volved were transferred to the peacetime troops. According to the 
order, the troops should be established at 7-10 days' notice.148 
The fundamental idea behind neutrality surveillance was ex- 
pressed most clearly in an operation order issued by General Head-
quarters in December 1956, that if protection measures had to be 
initiated rapidly, use should be made of the peacetime troops and 
further troops should be formed to build them up to the A-comple-
ment. The next stage after that would be to assemble, reinforce and 
station the neutrality surveillance troops, while the conscripts were 
to return to barracks to continue their training. These would form 
part of the reserves at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Defence Forces and the regional commanders. 
The overall field of neutrality protection was divided into sur-
veillance and patrolling on the one hand and armed defence on the 
other. The commands were to be responsible for the protection of 
neutrality within their respective areas of operations, while surveil-
lance of the land and sea boundaries was to be the responsibility of 
the Chief of the Frontier Guard, unless the border troops had been 
subordinated to the defence forces. Air surveillance was to remain 
in the hands of the Commander of the Air Force. Responsibility for 
armed defence was the task of the troops belonging to the Defence 
Forces. The basic principles, common to all commands, were as fol-
lows: 
- The troops on the land borders were to be stationed so that 
the local Frontier Guard units could be brought under the 
same command with relative ease. 
- The troops on the coasts and islands were to be grouped so 
as to ensure surveillance and occupation of the outermost 
islands. The other ground forces were to be stationed at the 
most significant defence points. 
- The troops reserved for surveillance and defence purposes 
were also to prevent intelligence operations, raids or other 
incursions from Finland into foreign territory. 
General Headquarters provided very precise orders on the use 
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of the neutrality surveillance troops and concentrated most of the 
formations in northern Finland, where the most concrete danger of 
a confrontation between the major powers existed. Thus three bri-
gades were assigned to the Northern Command, two of which were 
to be deployed in the far north of Lapland, while the 5 Jaeger Bri-
gade was to be deployed as a reserve on the border with Sweden.1"9 
The emphasis within the Southern Command was to be on the 
most probable areas for an amphibious landing. One infantry bri-
gade was to be marshalled in the Hanko area to repel attempts at 
landings or parachute drops, and the Uusimaa Brigade, composed 
predominantly of Swedish-speaking reservists, was to be transport-
ed to Åland.'° Neutrality surveillance in Ostrobothnia and the In-
land Region was to be the responsibility of the coastal artillery and 
marine surveillance troops. General Headquarters then planned to 
retain the 1 Jaeger Brigade and a tank battalion in full wartime es-
tablishment as reserves of its own.151  Once mobilized, the Jaeger bri-
gade would be stationed 100 kilometres north of Helsinki, where it 
would go into intensive training immediately.152 Surveillance of the 
long eastern border would remain largely the responsibility of the 
Frontier Guard, where the new troops to be created would amount 
to 6000 men in all.151 
The principal task of the Air Force in connection with the pro-
tection of neutrality would be air surveillance over the whole coun-
try, which would be divided into two surveillance regions, a South-
ern Region and a Northern Region, for the purposes of centralized 
command. In addition to nine fixed radar stations, a number of radar 
systems normally used for training purposes would deployed to cov-
er gaps in the radar coverage. Ten control centres were to be set up to 
form a functional basic network that would increase the efficiency of 
air surveillance, and the air surveillance companies that would have 
to be established to supplement the network would be deployed so 
as to be able to observe primarily flights crossing the country in an 
east-west direction, especially in Lapland."' The Air Force was nev-
ertheless able to carry out its flight duties only to a limited extent, 
on account of the shortage of aircraft and the primitive network of 
airfields." 
The main task for the Navy was to supplement the marine 
surveillance by means of intelligence gathering, guard duties and 
supervision of sea traffic over the whole of the country's sea area, 










Figure 11. Deployment of neutrality suiveillance forces 
trality. It was also to be prepared to lay first defensive minefields, 
to engage in minesweeping operations and to transport army units 
by sea. The reserves called up for naval service in the protection of 
neutrality were to form a Helsinki Flotilla belonging to the general 
forces and marine districts belonging to the local forces. The focus 
of marine surveillance was to be on the Archipelago Sea, where re-
connaissance was to be extended to the sea area around Åland and 
the northern Baltic Sea. Particular preparations for the closure of sea 
areas by minelaying were to be made in the area between Åland and 
Helsinki, while the main focus of minesweeping operations was to 
be the channel leading from the eastern boundary of Finland's sea 
area to the Gulf of Bothnia. The main transport duties were likely to 
consist of the movement of troops to Åland.156 
The naval order of battle planned for these neutrality surveil-
lance duties corresponded to the A-complement level as far as the 
number of vessels was concerned, which in practice meant that when 
the entire peacetime fleet was mobilized the Navy would have at its 
disposal one squadron of gunboats, two squadrons of fast gunboats, 
three squadrons of fast patrol boats, three squadrons of minesweep-
ers and one squadron of minelayers. In addition to these, a large 
number of civilian craft would be requisitioned for use by the marine 
surveillance companies and coastal artillery.157 
The commands were engaged in preparing their plans for neu-
trality surveillance troops and the implementation of the duties as-
signed to them during the years 1957-58, after which the plans re-
mained in force for the rest of the decade.158 
5.5. National defence under the code name"Valpuri" 
The aim of operation order no. 13, code-named"Valpuri" (OpO-57), 
signed by General K. A. Heiskanen, Commander-in-Chief of the 
Defence Forces, in December 1957, was to replace the national de-
fence order of 1952 (OpO-52) and re-define the tasks of the military 
forces with respect to interception of any attack on Finland or on 
the Soviet Union via Finland and compliance with Finland's military 
obligations under international agreements. Once more, in the spirit 
of the Cooperation Agreement with the Soviet Union, the order was 
based on a threat scenario that implied aggression from the west. 
OpO-57 set out the military action required for defence against 
an attack on the whole country, detailing the goals on the basis of 
which 
- control could be retained over areas of vital importance for 
the country's continued defence, 
- the aggressor would be subjected to active harassment and 
delaying action from the outset, so that once a propitious 
situation prevailed the invaders could be destroyed or forced 
into a ceasefire on conditions favourable to Finland, and 
- the aggressor could be prevented from reaching the Soviet 
Union via Finnish territory. 
The aim of this order was to create a basic grouping of the Finn-
ish forces that met the needs of the complex set of alternatives facing 
the Finns at that time, so that the fast deployment troops would cov-
er the full mobilization. Then a sufficient force could be concentrat-
ed in each area of defensive significance that the situation could be 
stabilized and the reserves available to General Headquarters could 
be concentrated at decisive points, while at the same time comply-
ing with Finland's military obligations under existing international 
agreements to which the country was a signatory.159 
The new operational level created for this purpose, the com-
mand, has already been referred to in the above section on neutrality 
surveillance. It was observed in the general part of the Field Regula-
tions published in 1958 that the regional organization responsible 
for the preparation and implementation of conscription, supervi-
sion of the conscripts and the preparation and implementation of 
mobilization was to be based on the military provinces and mili-
tary districts, the boundaries of which broadly followed those of the 
country's civilian administration. For the implementation of opera-
tional plans, on the other hand, it was possible for the Commander-
in-Chief of the Defence Forces to divide the country into commands 
each comprising one or more military provinces. The commander of 
each command was in charge of all peacetime preparations carried 
out in his area,160 but after mobilization the commands would be 
replaced with areas of responsibility for armies and groups. Under 
the new operational force structure Finland was divided into four 
commands: 
- Southern Command (SC) 
- Ostrobothnia Command (OC) 
- Northern Command (NC) 
- Inland Command (IC) 
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The peacetime headquarters for these commands were to be the 
divisional headquarters, except in the case of Ostrobothnia, where it 
was to be the headquarters of the military province. Upon trans-
fer to the wartime command structure following mobilization, these 
regions would be replaced by three armies and the Ostrobothnia 
Group.161 The command relations for defence preparation purposes 
were thus far clearer than in the 1952 operational plan, although the 
new distribution into commands still did not conform to the general 
administrative division of the country but was based on purely mili-
tary considerations. 
The defence zones for the above regions mainly conformed to 
those defined in the 1952 plan, with the exception that the Inland 
Defence Region was no longer responsible by 1960 for preparations 
for the defence of the innermost zone against an attack from the 
west. 
The number of brigades of fast deployment troops to be formed 
had been reduced considerably relative to the 1952 situation, and 
was now set at 10 instead of 15, but the total complement of the 
additional forces was still considered high, around 150,000 men, be-
cause it was still not certain whether they could be called up and 
equipped sufficiently quickly. The number of brigades to be formed 
for the wartime complement remained at 28.162  
For the planning of wartime operations a zone of operations 
was defined in each command such that all tasks and operations 
were to be carried out forward of the rear edge of this zone. Prepa-
rations for the repulsion of a major invasion or airborne landing or 
for the prevention of an air attack were also to be extended to other 
parts of the command outside the zone of operations. 
For the purposes of discharging assignments and maintaining 
control over areas of importance, one or more defence zones were 
defined within each zone of operation, and defence positions were 
to be set up in the parts of these zones that were most critical as far 
as the combat situation was concerned. Sufficient depth in defence 
was to be created by planning additional zones in the rear of the de-
fined zones of operations, so that the troops assigned to them would 
be able to block any surprise breakthroughs, ensure that terrain of 
crucial importance remained in the troops' possession and create fa-
vourable operational conditions for the deployment of the General 
Headquarters' reserves. 
The role of systematic guerrilla warfare as part of the defen- 
sive operations was emphasized in this plan, and it was noted that 
preparations should be made for engaging the enemy in the sparsely 
populated forest areas of the country by means of guerrilla tactics, 
so that as large a proportion of the conventional combat forces as 
possible could be reserved for counter-attacks aimed at achieving a 
decisive outcome. 
The OpO-57 orders also included planning and preparation 
connected with evacuation of the civilian population. This was to 
be led by the head of civilian protection (väestönsuojelupäällikkö) 
in close cooperation with the high command of the Defence Forces 
and with the help of the provincial and local civilian authorities. The 
population was divided for evaluation purposes into two urgency 
categories, those who were unable to work, comprising the elderly, 
children and the sick, and those who were capable of working. 
Evacuation was seen as taking place in three phases: voluntary 
evacuation, evacuation of the population that was unable to work to 
nearby areas, and finally evacuation of the population and property 
from a potential battle zone under the supervision of the military 
authorities. Under the new plan it was the commands that were 
entrusted with the task of planning this final stage of evacuation, 
the emphasis being on the population living close to the national 
boundaries. It was still not possible to enter into any extensive coop-
eration with the civilian authorities on these matters, however. 
Brigade Armoured Brigade Corps HQ 
Independent 
battalion 
NC 3/6 - 1/2 3/4 
SC 2/9 - 3/3 4/8 
IC 0/2 - 1/2 3/4 
OC 0/2 - - 0/2 
Reserves 2/8 1/1 1/4 2/4 
TOTAL 8/27 1/1  6/ 11 9/22 
Explanation: Fast Deployment Forces/Full Wartime Forces 
Figure 12. The order of battle according to OpO-57 
5.5.1. The Southern Command 
It was the task of the Southern Army in the event of an invasion 
from Norway in the north to secure the coast of its region and pre- 
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pare to repel parachute landings in the Åland area in particular. If 
hostilities were to extend to the Baltic region—alternative scenario B, 
for which the army's basic plan was to be constructed—it was to re-
pulse any attacks on the coast or Åland and cooperate with the Navy 
in preventing the enemy from entering the Gulf of Bothnia via Åland 
and the Archipelago Sea.163 
The Southern Army was assigned two defence zones: Aland 
and the Archipelago Sea, which included the Åland Islands and the 
islands of Turku, and the coastal zone, the outer edge of which ran 
from the islands off the coast east of Helsinki as far as those located 
north-east of Turku, while the inner edge was drawn some 30-50 
kilometres inland.164 For these purposes two brigades and a Jaeger 
brigade were to be assigned to the Southern Army at the fast de-
ployment stage and the number of brigades was to be raised to eight 
upon transfer to the full wartime complement.165 
General Headquarters issued fairly precise instructions regard-
ing the deployment of troops, which was to take place in such a 
way that both the Hanko Peninsula and the Åland Islands could be 
defended efficiently at the fast deployment stage by assigning a bri-
gade and a Jaeger battalion under the command of the corps head-
quarters to each area. The section of the corps operating on Åland 
would then be augmented to two brigades under the full wartime 
complement and that defending Hanko to three brigades. Similarly 
the defences of the Helsinki area would be reinforced with an army 
corps of two brigades, while another two brigades would be held 
in reserve for counter-attacks primarily in the Hanko Peninsula and 
Helsinki areas.166 
5.5.2. Northern Command 
In the event of an attack directed at its area of responsibility ex-
clusively from Norway, the Northern Army would concentrate on 
repulsing that attack, maintaining control over the main intersec-
tions of transport routes in northern Lapland and preventing the 
insurgent from reaching the Soviet Union via Finnish territory. If the 
attack were to come from Sweden as well, the army's duties would 
alter to the extent of concentrating its defensive action in the Kemi-
jokiValley. 
Three defence zones were defined for the Northern Army,167 
which would have three brigades at its disposal at the fast deploy- 
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ment stage, one of which would be held in reserve for use in the 
west, on the Swedish border, while the remaining two would be de-
ployed in the far north of Lapland. The additional brigades to be 
assigned to the region under the full wartime complement—a maxi-
mum of four—would be deployed in the Oulu—Kemi—Rovaniemi area 
under all the scenarios."' 
5.5.3. Inland Command 
The area of responsibility of the Inland Army was defined under the 
Opo-57 as a rear area in which a large proportion of the country's 
armaments industry and the majority of the high command's sup-
ply depots and reserve troops would be concentrated. If the attack 
were to come entirely from Norway, it would be the task of the In-
land Army to secure its own area and prevent raiding parties from 
infiltrating into the Soviet Union through that area. This would be a 
more demanding proposition if the Baltic Sea were also to become a 
scene of hostilities, for then the Inland Army would have to mount 
a defence against offensives from the Gulf of Finland, protect the 
industrial plants in its area and prevent the enemy from penetrating 
as far as the Soviet Union through its territory.169 
The Commander of the Inland Army would have three Jaeger 
battalions under him at the fast deployment stage, and these would 
be deployed along the main communication routes to the Soviet 
Union. Transfer to the wartime complement would mean the arrival 
of two new infantry brigades, one of which would be deployed on the 
coast to prevent landings and the other on the narrower isthmuses 
in the Saimaa regions to hold these strategic points, and a Jaeger 
brigade, which would be held in reserve for deployment around the 
major water barrier in Southern Finland, the N-S-oriented channel 
of the River Kymi. The potential tasks for these reserves were de-
tailed as being the prevention of parachute landings, counter-attacks 
towards the coastline and the manning of a north-south defence 
line.170 Two Frontier Guard detachments would be stationed to the 
east of the brigades, immediately adjacent to the Soviet border. 
5.5.4. The Ostrobothnia Area of Responsibility 
The task of the Ostrobothnia Group would naturally depend on the 
probability of a threat from Sweden. Thus the starting-point for plan- 
72 
ving was taken to be scenario B, in which an attack over the Gulf of 
Bothnia was regarded as fairly improbable and the troops assigned 
to the Ostrobothnia Group would be responsible simply for supervi-
sion of the sea area. After mobilization the group would receive two 
further brigades and would be expected to repel attempted landings 
or parachute drops from the Gulf of Bothnia and protect the crucial 
rail junction at Seinäjoki. It was also expected to cooperate with the 
Navy to prevent enemy troops from passing through the Quark and 
into the Bothnian Bay and thereby posing a threat to the rear of the 
northern Army. 
5.5.5. High command reserves 
The reserves remaining under General Headquarters in full wartime 
complement would comprise 10 brigades, including one armoured 
brigade. These reserves were intended initially to remain in the ar-
eas where they had been formed, seven in the Inland Command, 
two in the Southern Command and one in the Ostrobothnia area 
of responsibility, and to prepare for concentration in the direction of 
perceived threats, of which the order from the General Headquar-
ters recognised three.171  
Two of the areas of deployment for the reserves were located to 
the north and north-west of Helsinki, where their main tasks would 
be to prepare to respond to enemy landings with counter-attacks in 
either the Hanko or Porkkala area, to defend Helsinki and to react 
to a major airborne operation focused in the area north of the capi-
tal. A maximum of three brigades would be grouped in this area at 
the fast deployment stage, but the number could increase to eight 
altogether, under the command of two corps headquarters, at the 
wartime complement stage.172 
The high command reserves to be assigned to the Northern 
Command at the fast deployment stage, a maximum of three bri-
gades, would be stationed mainly at the level of Kemi and Rovani-
emi, from where they could be used to reinforce the defences on the 
main road leading from north to south and also cover the direction of 
the Swedish border. At the full wartime complement stage the num-
ber of reserve brigades would increase to a maximum of eight and 
they would be concentrated at the Oulu—Kajaani level, their main 
task very probably being to mount counter-attacks northwards from 
Oulu or to hold the rear defence zone of the Northern Command.13  
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Figure 13. Planned concentration areas of fast deployment forces 
(OpO-57) 
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5.5.6. Air Defence 
The Field Regulations defined air defence as comprising air surveil-
lance, anti-aircraft measures, fighter defence and air-raid warning.174 
The developing of Finland's air defences in the 1950s had been pri-
marily a matter of improving air surveillance, but the dramatic ad-
vances in performance capacity that ensued with the introduction of 
the first jet aircraft meant that surveillance by visual observation, on 
which the country's air surveillance had been almost entirely depen-
dent during the Second World War, in spite of the existence of about 
twenty radar stations, had become thoroughly outdated.171 The basic 
air surveillance plan, completed in the early 1950s, had included a 
network of 23 fixed and 10 mobile radar stations, the first-phase lo-
cations of which were approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Defence Forces in March 1954.176 The first phase was then completed 
over the years 1954-1956, when the first 10 stations were installed. 
This initial network was fairly modest in terms of performance and 
there were many gaps in radar coverage, especially near the Nor-
wegian border on the north-western "arm" of Finland, in southern 
Lapland and in the eastern parts of Kainuu, and it was impossible to 
observe aircraft flying at altitudes of over 10,000 metres at all. Also, 
the observation distance was so short that even at best the range 
could be extended only a few tens of kilometres over the border. 
Another problem was the slowness of communications.17 
By the early 1960s, however, the air defence network, comprising 
a radio link system for the rapid communication of air surveillance 
data, visual observation units and command centres in addition to 
the radar stations, had been developed to a substantial degree. The 
decision to proceed to the second stage in its construction had been 
taken in 1955, and the network had subsequently been expanded, 
first with ten new Finnish radar devices capable of measuring cruis-
ing height as well as position, and then with ten American mobile 
devices. The following year the Cabinet had decided that a direction-
al radio network should be acquired, and the development plan also 
included the founding and equipping of some 40 air surveillance 
companies designed for visual observation.178  
As far as radar equipment was concerned, the surveillance net-
work was constructed more or less as planned, and there were 19 
fixed and 10 mobile radar stations in operation by the end of 1961,179  
but the performance of the network was still not satisfactory. Only 
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the newest of the radar devices was capable of detecting targets at 
altitudes of 10-20 kilometres, and supersonic targets were difficult to 
identify in any case. In addition, there were still notable radar dead 
zones in the northernmost parts of Finland in spite of efforts to plug 
the gaps.180 
In order to improve observation distances and the timing of 
early warnings, the Defence Forces were authorized to purchase 
three high-power radar devices during the years 1961-1965,181 to be 
located at the Air Force command centres at Tampere, Kuopio and 
Rovaniemi. The detection efficiency of this system was considerable 
better, implying a range of 300-400 kilometres depending on flight 
altitude.182 
As far as the deployment of fighter aircraft was concerned, the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces set up a separate Air-
craft Committee in 1956 to make a thorough survey of the tasks of 
the Air Force at different stages in a military crisis and to submit 
proposals for the complement of the Air Force and the numbers of 
pilots required.183 
The committee identified the deployment of interceptor air-
craft as the principal task of the Air Force in the event of a crisis, 
maintaining that these should be capable of preventing incursions 
into Finnish airspace if the threat of hostilities arose and of inflicting 
losses on the enemy at times of war. A force should be created that 
could be concentrated on specific targets and would thereby con-
stitute a deterrent against enemy attacks on protected installations 
etc. Reconnaissance and close air support were regarded as being of 
secondary importance."' 
Successful peacetime surveillance of Finnish neutrality alone 
would call for a fleet of 60 fighter aircraft, while in the event of war-
i.e. at the stage of rapid deployment of the ground forces—the Air 
Force should be capable of intercepting three fairly large formations 
of bombers and of protecting the main junctions in the routes used 
to concentrate the ground forces, all of which would require virtually 
a hundred subsonic fighter aircraft and 36 high performance super-
sonic aircraft. The requirement was then likely to be almost doubled 
as the war proceeded. By the time the committee had added other 
categories of aircraft—ground attack planes, transporters and recon-
naissance planes—the total requirement amounted to more than 
300.185 
The plan for the acquisition of aircraft was far too ambitious and 
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entirely divorced from reality, so that by the end of the decade the 
Air Force had only about twenty jets, none of which was armed with 
air-to-air missiles.18" The situation regarding airstrips had greatly 
improved, however, partly on account of an expansion in civil avia-
tion and partly through government job-creation projects. Thus a 
report of 1961 placed the number of facilities suitable for jets at 13, 
although it admitted that the majority of these were located on the 
coast, close to the larger concentrations of population, and that there 
were still substantial gaps in the support system."' 
The command structure was to be revised under the OpO-57 
orders, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces had 
also approved major changes in the mobilization book at the end of 
1957. The intention was to scrap the brigade-based wartime organi-
zation and replace it with a command structure based on a peace-
time complement, as in the ground forces. Each wing commander 
was to be responsible for operational preparations in his area, and 
upon transfer to a higher level of alert a system of flight districts 
was to be adopted, the number of which had been raised to six. The 
wartime complement of the Air Force was to consist of eight fighter 
squadrons, two reconnaissance squadrons and three all-weather in-
terceptor squadrons.1"' 
Peacetime Wartime Flight district 
complement complement 
Satakunta Wing 2nd Wing Southwestern Flight District 
Pohjanmaa Flight District 
Häme Wing ist Wing Lapland Flight District 
Kainuu Flight District 
Karelia Wing 3rd Wing Savonia-Karelia Flight District 
Kymi Flight District 
Figure 14. Complements of the Air Force 
The operational tasks assigned at each level of alert did not dif-
fer radically from those laid down in the 1952 orders, in that the Air 
Force was still expected to arrange for aerial surveillance, provide 
fighter defence for installations of national importance and support 
the ground forces and navy as the situation required. The empha-
sis in fighter defence operations was to be on protecting the main 
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centres of population and industry, in addition to which protection 
was to be provided, wherever the situation permitted, for the main 
movements of troops by rail following full mobilization. The focus of 
anti-aircraft units should be on the same areas as for Air Force oper-
ations. It should be noted, however, that the wartime complement of 
the Air Force was assumed in these plans to be that recommended 
by the Aircraft Committee and not the actually existing level.189 
5.5.7. Sea defence 
The tasks assigned to the Navy in the OpO-57 orders remained more 
or less unchanged in spite of the return of the Porkkala Peninsula by 
the Soviet Union in 1956. The focus of its activities in the event of 
the outbreak of war was still to be on the Archipelago Sea and the 
Åland Islands.19° The best vessels and those at the highest level of 
alert were to be subordinated to the ist  Flotilla and dispatched to de-
fend the Åland Islands until such time as units of the Southern Army 
could be moved there. It was to accomplish this defence by mining 
the main entry channels to the islands, preparing to attack any en-
emy amphibious forces and preventing the enemy from entering the 
Gulf of Bothnia. Once this was completed the flotilla would transfer 
to supporting the operations of the ground forces in southern Fin-
land.191 
The task of the Gulf of Finland Maritime District consisted of 
reconnaissance and support for the ground forces in the Helsin-
ki—Porkkala and Hanko areas, which would also be the main areas 
for defensive minelaying operations. The Archipelago Sea Maritime 
District would be responsible for transporting troops to Åland in co-
operation with the 1st Flotilla and for mining of the sea area if com-
manded separately to do so. The reconnaissance and combat activi-
ties of the Gulf of Bothnia Maritime District were to be focused in 
the Quark, the narrowest part of the gulf. In addition to the above 
tasks, each district was to be prepared to control sea traffic in its own 
area, transport troops as required and organize sea and air surveil-
lance.lan 












squadron 1 - - - 
Training ship 1 - - - 
Fast gunboat 
squadron 2 - - - 
Patrol boat 
squadron - 1 3 1 
Minesweeper 
squadron 1 3 4 1 
Minelayer 
squadron 2 - - - 
Transport 
squadron - 1 2 - 
Transport boat 
squadron - 3 3 1 
Figure 15. Principal naval units according to OpO-57 
As may be seen in the accompanying table, the main concen-
tration of naval forces, at least on the outbreak of hostilities, was to 
be in the Åland and Archipelago Sea area, while defence in the Gulf 
of Finland was to rely largely on the coastal artillery and the use of 
sea mines. These latter two elements were closely linked in order 
to prevent the enemy from entering areas of particular importance 
to the national defence. The defensive minefields were so sited that 
they would close off the majority of the main sea channels, while the 
coastal artillery was charged with preventing any enemy minesweep-
ing attempts. Defensive mining was to begin around Åland, which 
would have no resident defence force on the outbreak of hostilities, 
and would then be extended to the Helsinki—Porkkala and Hanko 
areas.193  
The greatest alteration to the peacetime composition of the 
coastal artillery took place in the area west of Helsinki once the So-
viet Union had relinquished control over the Porkkala Peninsula, the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces issuing an immediate or-
der for the establishment of a powerful coastal artillery in the area.194 
A second significant change concerned the heavy artillery 
pieces that the Control Commission had ordered to be confined to 
the Navy depot, as the Defence Council decided in 1959 that these 
should be replaced in their fortresses.195 This naturally improved 
the response capacity of the static coastal artillery considerably, as 
it would have taken months to position these guns in the event of 
an outbreak of war. The early 1960s did indeed mark a boost in the 
development of the coastal artillery as a whole, a trend that contin-
ued into the 1980s, and the situation in 1963 was that this arm of 
the defence forces had a wartime complement of eight artillery regi-
ments manning 16 coastal artillery battalions consisting of some 50 
artillery batteries.196 The main batteries were located in the fortresses 
used for training national servicemen, fortresses which were both 
structurally in relatively good condition, fairly well armed and at a 
high level of readiness.19' 
The coastal artillery network was supplemented with 12 mobile 
coastal artillery battalions,198 and other mobile solutions for devel-
oping the coastal defences were also adopted around the end of the 
decade, including the creation of troops of a new kind, coastal Jaeger 
battalions intended for counter-attack purposes alongside the static 
coastal artillery positions and somewhat inflexible coastal defence 
battalions.199 
Surveillance of the sea areas played a major part in the pro-
tection of Finnish neutrality, and work on the improvement of this 
system had begun in the early 1950s—as in the case of air surveil-
lance. Patrolling of the sea areas was the joint responsibility of the 
Defence Forces, the Frontier Guard and the Maritime Administra-
tion. A memorandum from the General Headquarters Operations 
Division in 1959 nevertheless indicated that there was a great deal 
still to do to improve marine surveillance and that an intensification 
plan drawn up three years earlier had only been about half imple-
mented.20° 
The situation developed more rapidly in the early 1960s, how-
ever. A new statute on land, sea and air surveillance was promulgated 
in 1963, and in the same year the Commander-in-Chief of the De-
fence Forces approved a set of instructions for maritime surveillance 
which defined its practical implementation and command relations. 
These instructions assigned ultimate responsibility for maritime 
surveillance to the Defence Forces, in cooperation with the Fron-
tier Guard and Maritime Administration, the headquarters for this 
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activity being located in the Naval Headquarters, which was to be 
responsible for compiling and maintaining real-time maritime situ-
ation reports. A total of 18 maritime surveillance stations, of which 
ten were to be equipped with radar, were to be set up for imple-
mentation purposes. As it would not have been useful, nor feasible 
in terms of communications systems, to have all of these stations 
directly subordinated to Naval Headquarters, the four peacetime 
coastal artillery contingents and the Gulf of Bothnia Marine Frontier 
Guard formed regional command centres that were responsible for 
the maritime surveillance centres in their areas and compiled situa-
tion reports. The system was not entirely comprehensive, however, 
as underwater activity continued to go largely unsupervised in the 
absence of the necessary sonar equipment, the process of acquiring 
which had only just begun. There were also large gaps in the visual 
observation and radar networks.201 
6. Development of plan-57, aimed at tighter 
defence of the eastern border 
The operational orders issued by General Headquarters in 1957 were 
chiefly intended to define the defensive preparations to be made with 
respect to a threat arising from the west and were highly confiden-
tial and conformed with the country's political commitments at that 
time. Thus Plan-57 could be said to have been primarily a political 
plan, the underlying aim of which was to demonstrate to the Soviet 
Union that Finland was capable of fulfilling her obligations under 
the FCMA Treaty if required. Major-General Juhani Ruutu summed 
up the true significance of Plan-57 very well in his interview when 
he said that"An attack from the west was not regarded as being even 
to the slightest degree probable, but the threat posed by the"helper" 
in the east was a real and serious one. It was therefore necessary to 
be prepared for consultations and to be able to demonstrate con-
vincingly that we were able to manage without help from the east. It 
was for this reason that great care was taken to shape Plan-57 into 
an impressive set of documents."202 
It was more difficult, of course, to outline a strategic line of 
defence against the threat posed by the Soviet Union itself, as no 
such plan could exist in an official sense. Finland nevertheless had a 
long land boundary with the Soviet Union and earlier experiences of 
dealing with that country did not arouse any great feelings of trust, 
any more than did the events of 1956 in Hungary or the"night frost" 
period in Finnish-Soviet relations in 1958. The defence of the east-
ern border with ground forces had been planned on the basis of the 
Salpa Line in 1944, and contingents had been designated to main-
tain the fortifications and weaponry of that line during the post-war 
period.203 The accent during the 1950s, however, had been on sta-
bilizing political relations in that direction, and plans and prepara-
tions for military action had effectively been impossible in such a 
situation. 
Little written documentation remains on the perceived threat 
from the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s, as all speculation 
on the subject was of an exceedingly delicate and confidential na-
ture. But attention was inevitably paid to this threat, especially at the 
heart of the Defence Forces' operational planning, in the Operations 
Division at General Headquarters. 
An overall impression of the perceived threat during the late 
1950s and early 1960s may be obtained from an analysis entitled 
"Finland's strategic position and the strategic principles laid down 
for the national defence", produced by the Operations Division and 
dated 11th November 1960. The analysis considered both NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact as threats to Finland.204 
The document regarded Finland's position in the Cold War op-
position between East and West as a major starting point for such an 
analysis, alongside the existing treaties and agreements, and came 
to the conclusion that"Finland regards itself as a neutral state that is 
obliged to take into account the demands placed on it by the Agree-
ment of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance and to a 
certain extent the opinions of the Soviet Union on political and eco-
nomic issues." 
The analysis dealt in some depth with the threats to Finland's 
non-aligned position likely to be posed by both NATO and the Sovi- 
et Union in different situations and in different parts of the country, 
and concluded that the initiative and overwhelming power rested 
with the Soviet Union. The outcome of its deliberations was summed 
up in two concluding statements: 
a) "The greatest immediate threat to Finland in an unexpected 
crisis situation will always arise from the Soviet Union, but prepara-
tions should also be made to counter Western action in the air, in 
northern Finland and in the Baltic region. 
b) Only the development of a military situation that is more 
favourable to the West or Swedish membership of NATO can give 
rise to an immediate threat of a Western offensive against Finland." 
Although an internal communist revolution was no longer 
regarded as probable by this stage, the evident Soviet intention to 
spread communism by peaceful means was taken as a more serious 
threat. This new approach was regarded as a matter of some im-
portance because, as an immediate neighbour of the Soviet Union, 
Finland was always in danger of becoming a satellite Soviet state by 
this means.205 
The analysis nevertheless set out not from political expediency 
but from the military potential existing in the surrounding areas. It 
was estimated in the early 1960s that the Soviet Union had at least 
10 army divisions in the Leningrad Military District alone, i.e. close to 
the border with Finland, and that these included two airborne divi- 
sions.206 In addition, the Baltic Fleet was regarded as being the most 
powerful of the Soviet naval fleets, with about fifty heavily armed 
surface vessels, almost a hundred submarines and several hundred 
smaller ships, so that it would easily be able to make tactical land-
ings on the Finnish coast to back up overland operations.207 
The development of the Soviet armed forces and their high 
level of alert were the main reasons for the Finnish decision to put a 
greater effort into the development of the readiness of the defence 
forces. The starting point for operational planning and the raising of 
the level of readiness was increasingly taken to be a surprise attack. 
The limitation of any such attack and the gaining of time for mobi-
lization would call for peacetime forces that were at a high level of 
alert and readily available fast deployment forces.208 
The demand for faster mobilization led to a substantial increase 
in the troops to be formed on the cadre principle under an order is-
sued in 1960. In accordance with this new philosophy, the peacetime 
troops would directly raise their complement to the wartime level, 
forming what were to be known as"standing troops", a new concept 
that replaced the former A-complement.209 
The primary aim of this new system was to speed up the mo-
bilization and deployment of new troops, the demand for standing 
forces being that they should be ready to march to their first op-
erational stations on the first or second day of formation, while the 
other fast deployment forces should be capable of doing so by the 
second to fourth day. The interval was then somewhat longer for the 
main body of troops, but the understanding was nevertheless that 
the combat forces should be ready for deployment in their entirety 
within a week of formation.210 
The first troops to be formed—the standing troops of some 30,000 
men—would include a Jaeger battalion based on each peacetime bri-
gade and a light detachment of a few hundred men formed by each 
peacetime battalion. The six of the former would be created and sev-
en of the latter. In addition, the Armoured Brigade would form part 
of the wartime Armoured Brigade and the field artillery contingents 
would form five artillery battalions that could be attached Jaeger 
battalions if necessary, to form versatile independent battle groups. 
The peacetime coastal artillery would form the main batteries for 
their fortresses, backed up by a number of anti-aircraft units. The 
Frontier Guard would bring its companies up to full strength, and 
the new system of standing troops would imply as far as the Navy 
TROOPS la. lb. lc. la. Standing troops 
lb. Troops formed by 
peacetime contingents 
le. Troops formed by military 
districts 
Light 7 - - 
detachment 
Jaeger 6 6 1 
battalions 
Brigades - 6 - In cooperation with the 
military districts 
Armoured - 1 - NB. Armoured Brigade would 
brigades form a separate detachment of 
standing troops 
Jaeger brigade - 2 - 
headquarters 
Corps - 5 - 
headquarters 
Frontier 19 - - 
companies 
Frontier Jaeger - 13 - 
battalions 
Anti-aircraft 6 14 7 27 
batteries 
Field artillery - 7 - 
regiments 
Field artillery 5 2 - 7 
battalions 
Fighter - 3 - 
squadrons 
Gunboat - 1 1 NB. part of the squadron in the 
squadrons standing troops 
Fast gunboat - 2 - NB. part of the squadron in the 
squadrons standing troops 
Figure 16. Fast deployment forces, by units responsible for their mo-
bilization..212 
was concerned that the crews of the ships already deployed would 
be made up to full wartime strength. In the case of the Air Force the 
standing troops corresponded to the main body of radar-equipped 
troops required for air surveillance duties.211  
The formation of standing troops would be followed by the cre-
ation of the remainder of the fast deployment forces, the majority of 
the combat troops belonging to which would be formed around the 
existing peacetime contingents. These would comprise six infantry 
brigades and an armoured brigade raised to its wartime complement, 
together with four border brigades set up by the Frontier Guard. 
It could be claimed with some justification that the aim of this 
refinement of the Plan-57 was specifically to improve the Defence 
Forces' response to the Soviet threat. According to the plan about 
half of the infantry troops available to the ground forces should be 
deployed initially in the main areas of emphasis, the north and the 
south-west. A third of the brigades and most of the Jaeger battalions 
were to be retained in the Inland Command. Most of these troops 
would be General Headquarters reserves, however, with only three 
brigades subordinated to the Inland Command itself. Although they 
had preparatory tasks elsewhere, these ground forces in their initial 
wartime deployment represented in reality a response to the Soviet 
threat,213 and the use of these reserves against a possible Soviet in-
vasion had been planned jointly by the General Headquarters Op-
erations Division and the 3`d Division in the late 1950s and early 
19605 .214 
Preparations were also made for using the Salpa Line for the 
defence of the long eastern border, and it was intended that a large 
proportion of the troops assigned to the commander of the Inland 
Defence Region should be deployed on this line.215 
In addition to the above, some of the operational tasks detailed 
in the OpP-57 orders were of a kind that they could be performed 
regardless of the direction from which the attack might come. A case 
in point was that of the Aland Islands, which were to be occupied as 
quickly as possible in all situations.216 
The role of the Frontier Guard was emphasized as the readiness 
developed. General Headquarters had already been interested in in-
creasing this organization's responsibility as part of Finnish defence 
principles in 1959, and the Chief of the General Staff had noted in 
March of that year that this was a question of 360° protection of the 
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national frontiers in accordance with the principle of neutrality and 
had nothing to do with military policy. He was quite right in em-
phasizing this, of course, although it was a new policy statement to 
make in public at that time.217 
The plans for action were nevertheless adapted in this direc-
tion, and preparations were made for creating a border brigade in 
each of four Frontier Guard districts in the event of the level of alert 
being raised, although it was assumed that actual patrolling of the 
border would continue to take place in the same manner as before, 
with responsibility resting with the border companies and battal- 
ions. At the fast deployment stage each brigade would also include 
Frontier Jaeger companies and battalions and separate units belong- 
ing to other arms and services. The composition of a Frontier Jaeger 
battalion (rajajääkäripataljoona) was equivalent to that of a Jaeger 
battalion. At the same time each brigade was to have a unit designed 
specifically for guerrilla warfare. On the completion of their border 
patrol and fast deployment assignments, all the troops in a brigade 
were to prepare to transfer to guerrilla warfare.218 
The order for making preparations for the creation of border 
guard detachments, issued in February 1960, meant a major change 
relative to the earlier mobilization tasks, as the wartime complement 
of the Frontier Guard was to increase by almost 12,000 men and the 
transfer of responsibility for this from the military districts to the 
existing units, on the cadre principle, would mean that the troops 
could be formed more quickly.219 
This change led to a revision of the operational plans. The fast 
deployment forces attached to the Inland Army, for instance, would 
increase by a third under these new arrangements, as there would be 
two frontier brigades functioning in its region, with more demand-
ing duties than earlier. These would be responsible for covering the 
mobilization and concentration of the main forces on the eastern 
border at the fast deployment stage.22° 
The preparation and development of operational plans naturally re-
quired the holding of exercises and war games to test the function-
ing of existing plans and frequently also developing the new ones. 
The questions we have to ask are whether these exercises were truly 
connected with the operational plans and whether the enemy action 
envisaged in them corresponded to the real threats. 
Exercises in response to the danger of an invasion began in the 
early 1950s. A typical war game was arranged by the headquarters 
of Helsinki Military Province in 1951, in which the initial scenario 
was that the Blue army (the Soviet Union) had captured Narvik in 
the course of an attack on northern Norway at the same time as the 
Yellow army (NATO) had succeeded in breaking through the Soviet 
defences in Central Europe, leading to major overland hostilities in 
Poland. The Yellow army had also occupied the island of Gotland, 
which had aroused a protest from Sweden, although the Swedish 
government had decided to content itself with observing the situ-
ation and had re-affirmed its neutrality. One factor contributing to 
the Yellow success had been its possession of atomic weapons. The 
scenario was an interesting one in that it assumed that Finland was a 
Soviet ally, so that the Soviet Union had not only its troops stationed 
in Porkkala but also fighter squadrons based at airfields in southern 
Finland.221  
The aim for the Yellow side was to capture the Soviet base at 
Porkkala by means of a force comprising two army corps, the basic 
idea being that one corps would make a landing at a point west of 
Helsinki and aim to cut off the road and rail connections with the 
Soviet Union, while the other would land on the Hanko Peninsula, 
west of Porkkala. TheYellow side would have the similar naval forces 
available for these landings as for those that had taken place during 
the Second World War. Hundreds of landing craft would be backed 
up by powerful naval detachments that included battleships and air-
craft carriers as well as other surface vessels. In addition to these 
the Yellow side would have an air force amounting to hundreds of 
modern aircraft.222 
A large-scale landing was also the theme of a war game orga-
nized by the War College in 1956, when it was imagined that two 
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armies and an operational group equipped for mobile warfare had 
landed in southern Finland with the aim of eliminating the troops 
deployed there. This exercise corresponded at least to the threat en-
visaged in alternative scenario B, as the area was to be defended by 
a total of 14 Finnish brigades. Again nuclear weapons were involved 
in the exercise.223  
The first extensive war game in northern Finland was held in 
1953, on the theme of the mounting of an operational counter-at-
tack. It was assumed that three divisions of an enemy force had at-
tacked from the north and succeeded in driving the defenders back 
to the Kemi—Rovaniemi defence line, i.e. the main defence zone of 
the Finnish forces in the existing operational plan. This caused the 
defenders to adopt delaying tactics, taking as their back line the 
southernmost defence zone in the real operational plan. The plan of 
battle was a fairly typical one for the Finns: after a certain delaying 
period they would defeat the attacking force at a suitable point in 
the terrain where they could marshal sufficient troops and then they 
would begin a counter-attack with the aim of destroying the enemy 
troops that had been contained in front of the defensive position.224 
Preparations for a nuclear war was the theme of a wide-scale 
war game initiated by the 3Td Division in 1961 and led by the Chief 
of the General Staff. In this scenario it was envisaged that NATO 
would have no confidence in Finland's position of neutrality but 
would assume that Finland would relinquish its transport and com-
munications network for Soviet use. This would lead the NATO air 
force to commence air attacks specifically on transport connections 
in southern Finland. After battles lasting several months the initia-
tive would pass to the West, leading to landings on Åland and the 
Hanko Peninsula, the areas perceived to in the greatest danger. This 
would be followed by a major landing in the area between Hanko 
and Kotka, and extensive bombing would ensue, including the use 
of a nuclear device on a rail junction. The exercise was realistic in the 
sense that the levels of command involved were virtually identical to 
those required in the real operational plans, and thus the war game 
itself, like all the war games designed at the operational level, was 
arranged only for certain carefully defined troops. The brigades, for 
instance, were represented only by their commanders or chiefs of 
staff.225 
The courses for commanding officers in all branches of the 
services decided upon by the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence 
Forces in 1960 were a separate thing again. Their purpose was to 
develop the operational capacity of the participants dealing with an 
army or the whole body of the Defence Forces. Thus the programme 
included numerous strategic tasks covering areas varying from a 
single command to the whole country. The task arranged in the first 
year was concerned with retention of control over the core area of 
the country. The point of departure was an imaginary North State 
occupying the northernmost part of Finland and having resources 
that amounted to 15-20 divisions, while the area south of Oulu be-
longed the South State, i.e. Finland, defended by 15 brigades, which 
corresponded fairly accurately to the combined strength of the ac-
tual northern Army and General Headquarters' reserves. The first 
three parts of the assignment were traditional exercises in the ap-
preciation of situations and decision-making. Measures were taken 
to repulse the enemy attack and a counter-attack was mounted, 
causing the enemy serious losses. The subsequent situations were 
more unconventional, however, as it was then assumed that both 
sides gained access to nuclear weapons. First the assailant detonated 
several such devices in the course of its attack, and then the par-
ticipants in the course were left to consider how they would deploy 
ground-to-ground tactical missiles equipped with nuclear warheads 
and megatonne-class nuclear bombs to be dropped from aircraft.226 
Unfortunately the suggestions made on that occasion have not been 
preserved, but it may be said that the exercise was directed more 
towards obtaining an understanding of the use of nuclear weapons 
than towards their actual use. 
Operations directed against the Soviet Union were practiced 
only in a clandestine manner. The 1962 course for commanding offi-
cers, for instance, included a strategic map exercise which enabled an 
assessment to be made of the chances of the Soviet Union invading 
southern Finland. Here an entirely fictitious military policy situation 
was envisaged in which a single country existing in the territory of 
the three Baltic States had determined to deny the Soviet Union ac-
cess to the Baltic Sea and for this purpose had set out to conduct an 
amphibious operation with associated airborne landings in southern 
Finland. In order to avoid the inevitable question of military coop-
eration with the Soviet Union as provided for in the Agreement of 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, it was assumed that 
no such agreement existed. Thus preparations needed to be made 
for action against the Soviet Union on Finland's eastern border.227 
The next war game arranged for the commanding officers as-
sumed that the attack had come from the Soviet Union, the main 
purpose of the exercise being to assess the need for troops to re-
pel an attack on the south coast. A politically sensitive situation was 
avoided by imagining a situation in which an enemy had been at-
tacking the Soviet Union along the southern coast of the Gulf of 
Finland for months and had succeeded in capturing the area of the 
Karelian Isthmus on the other side of the border with Finland and 
had now mounted an attack on Finland involving more than ten 
divisions, including a divisional-sized airborne operation in an area 
just east of Helsinki. The operation had been backed up with an at-
tack on Finnish Lapland from Norwegian territory. For the defenders 
this was a question of fighting for the country's whole existence, as 
seen from the fact that as the game proceeded all 15 brigades were 
placed under the commander responsible for that area, i.e. practi-
cally all the troops set aside for the Southern and Inland Commands 
under Plan-57 together with the majority of the High Command 
reserves.228 
The exercises and war games described above were performed 
without troops, but there were also some exercises that involved 
actual troops as well as the commanding officers, the most typical 
being various emergency and alert exercises aimed at testing the de-
ployment of the troops formed on the cadre principle to their first 
assignment. One example of such an exercise was that arranged in 
the area controlled by the 3r`' Division in September 1962 to test how 
quickly standing troops composed of conscripts could be deployed 
for the first time to protect a target of vital importance, in this case an 
airport not far from their barracks. It was characteristic of exercises 
of this kind that they did not have any broader scenario attached to 
them, i.e. there was no speculation regarding a possible enemy or 
development in the international political situation; the most impor-
tant thing was speed of action.229 
On account of her neutrality, Finland could not afford to be 
committed to resisting any particular enemy, and thus the enemy in 
the exercises was given various troop configurations: opposing force 
B reminded one of Russian organizations, opposing force C was a 
version of an American organization, and finally opposing force D 
was an unidentified alliance involved in developing atomic warfare, 
whether in the East or the West.23o 
Embarrassing questions were also avoided by carrying out the 
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field exercises, which of course could not be kept secret like war 
games, in areas which did not presuppose any particular assailant. 
Thus the major exercises in the years 1960-1968 involving two or 
more parties were held in the north on two occasions, in the east on 
two occasions and in the south or south-west on three occasions. 
Similarly the large-scale exercises involving one or more formations 
called for by General Headquarters were mostly held in southern or 
southwestern Finland.231  
It must thus be concluded that it is impossible to say anything 
regarding the true perceived threat to Finland or the actual deploy-
ment contemplated for the Defence Forces on the basis of the military 
exercises conducted during this period, as these, like the operational 
plans, were designed so as to support the official policy of neutrality 
and the conditions of the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and 
Mutual Assistance. This was a justifiable state of affairs, as the mili-
tary attaches stationed in Finland were eager to find out what enemy 
the country was really preparing to defend itself against. Relations 
with the Soviet Union were naturally the most difficult of all, as its 
representatives were constantly on the look-out for evidence of the 
spirit prevailing in the armed forces and would protest through their 
embassy whenever they detected any anti-Russian activity. A typical 
discussion was that held at the office of the Soviet military attache in 
January 1960, when the Finns attempted to ascertain the Russians' 
views on a possible alteration to the limitation on missiles contained 
in the Treaty of Paris. An embassy representative by the name of Fili-
pov cast doubts on the trustworthiness of the Finns on the grounds 
that they were still using enemy configurations that corresponded 
to the Soviet military organization in their exercises, whereupon the 
permanent secretary to the Ministry of Defence assured him that 
the enemy in such an exercise was simply a typical world power and 
certainly not specifically the Soviet army, and pointed out that the 
majority of the exercises were held in southwestern Finland and not 
on the eastern border, which was indeed true.232 
92 
8.1. The state of armaments in the early 1950s 
One of the foundations for the credibility of the defence plans was 
naturally the availability of equipment. It was estimated in 1952, for 
instance, that the fast deployment complement of roughly 320,000 
men could be armed and equipped tolerably well, although there 
would still be gaping deficiencies in this respect. The fast deploy-
ment ground forces would suffer from a shortage of both arms and 
ammunition of all descriptions, and the Air Force was expected to 
manage almost entirely with initial training aircraft, so that its actual 
combat effectiveness was regarded as virtual nil. The jet age had ir-
revocably passed it by.233  
The situation in the Navy was equally desperate. It possessed 
no modern combat vessels. The armoured vessel Väinämöinen had 
been sold to the Soviet Union in part settlement of the "German 
debt", the submarines had been withdrawn from service and sold 
for scrap under the terms of the peace treaty and the motor torpedo 
boats had been converted to motor gunboats.211 There were only a 
few ships that were even looked on as suitable for peacetime train-
ing purposes. The principal weapons system available to the Navy, 
its arsenal of sea mines, was largely awaiting repair, and the existing 
stock of serviceable mines was estimated to correspond to only 50% 
of the minimum requirement. 
8.2. The initial programme 
Towards the end of 1952 the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence 
Forces put forward comprehensive proposals for a new defence 
initiative and the resources necessary for this, in connection with 
which two basic acquisitions programmes intended to form the core 
of rearmament during the 1950s were laid before the President of 
Finland: a short-term Initial Programme (Atkuohjelma) and a lon-
ger-term Emergency Programme (Hätäohjelma).235  The aim of the 
Initial Programme, worth about 5,200 mill. Finnish marks and in-
tended for completion within a couple of years, was to obtain the 
93 
necessary equipment for training purposes and particularly for air 
surveillance and the deployment of fighter aircraft.236 
The plan could not be carried through in the desired manner, 
however, and was adapted in the form of a new programme costing 
6,500 mill. marks in 1954. This laid less emphasis on the Air Force 
and was directed more towards increasing the Defence Forces' op-
erational capacity and acquiring the necessary equipment for peace-
time training purposes. A large proportion of the material concerned 
was to be purchased from Finnish sources.131  
Approximately 4000 mill. marks out of the total sum invested 
over the period 1955-57 was spent on equipping the army, 900 mill. 
marks on the Navy and about 1700 mill. marks on the Air Force.238 
This included the first stages of a complete refurbishment of the 
ground forces' anti-tank system, with the ordering of a trial series 
of Finnish-built recoilless rifles. Similarly, the outdated radio equip-
ment was replaced and the availability of small arms was improved 
through a large order for sub-machine guns from Britain. Although 
funds were insufficient for solving the problem of the shortage of 
ammunition, orders were placed for the first large batches of Finn-
ish-made percussion fuses for mortar ammunition and the efficiency 
of the coastal artillery was improved by fitting the old guns with new 
barrels.239 
Funds had already been set aside in 1951 for developing the 
air surveillance system,24° and these together with the money ap-
portioned under the Initial Programme enable a total of 30 radar de-
vices of various kinds to be purchased in order to create the first na-
tional radar network. The purchase of fighter aircraft fell badly short 
of the target, however, as rising prices, procurement difficulties and 
the need to replace the training aircraft first meant that much less 
money was available for fighter purchases than had originally been 
planned. In the end 12 Folland Gnat fighters were acquired241 in ad-
dition to the 15 De HavillandVampires bought in 1953-56, the latter 
being regarded as more suitable for use primarily as jet trainers.242 
In 1955 the Navy put forward a shipbuilding programme aimed 
at acquiring two minelayers, four patrol vessels, 16 fast patrol boats, 
16 patrol boats and 12 transport vessels. Some of these were in- 
cluded in the Initial Programme and the first procurements were set 
in motion immediately. Since the programme enabled the first ships 
to be ordered from Finland, a shopping list was drawn up consisting 
of a minelayer, six minesweepers and a transport vessel, in addition 
to which two fast patrol boats were ordered from Britain. A few hun-
dred sea mines were also produced for naval use.243 
The ammunition issue posed a major problem, as the wartime 
stocks had been used up over the subsequent decade. Thus a report 
produced in 1956 claimed that stocks of ammunition for field guns 
and mortars amounted to only 10-20% of the estimated consump-
tion over six months at standard ammunition rates during a war. 
Nor was the situation regarding small arms ammunition any better, 
and a large proportion of the ammunition in stock was in need of 
servicing before it could be used.244 
8.3. The Emergency Programme 
The aim of the Emergency Programme, inaugurated at the same 
time as the last orders were placed under the Initial Programme in 
1957, was to equip the Defence Forces to the extent that Finland 
could meet her responsibilities under international agreements and 
maintain a defensive stand for the few months required to set the 
domestic armaments industry in motion and arrange to import es-
sential items of equipment from abroad. The total value of this pro-
gramme was around 40,000 mill. Finnish marks.245 
This programme would have meant a substantial improvement 
in Finland's defence capabilities. The largest single purchase was to 
have been a fleet of 60 fighters, 20 advanced training aircraft and 47 
primary training aircraft, as air surveillance remained a topic of em-
phasis in the programme.246 
More than half of the approx. 26,000 mill. marks assigned to the 
ground forces was earmarked for ammunition. The weapons used in 
the war were evidently still reckoned to be in reasonable condition, 
as only 6000 mill. marks were set aside for actual weapons, chiefly in-
fantry sub-machine guns and anti-tank weapons and new hardware 
for the anti-aircraft units. A total of 5000 mill. marks was planned for 
the replacement of outdated communications equipment.247 
The shipbuilding aspect of the Emergency Programme com-
prised two corvettes, a minelayer, four escort vessels and nine fast 
motor gunboats. Defences were also to be strength by acquiring 
more than 2000 new sea mines and a few dozen torpedoes. The 
main expenditure on coastal defence was to be the reconditioning of 
the artillery pieces and strengthening of the fortifications.248 
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The general outlines for the first years of the Emergency Pro-
gramme, 1957-1959, were approved by the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Defence Forces in 1956. This first phase, which partly overlapped 
with the Initial Programme, was based on the assumption that an-
nual funding for basic purchases would be of the order of 4000 mill. 
marks.249 The plan fell short of its target in the very first years, how-
ever, so that it was estimated that 20 years would be required for its 
completion.250 
When the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces ordered 
a revision of the Emergency Programme in 1960, the new target was 
the spending of a total of 60,000 mill. marks on the programme over 
the years 1961-70, primarily on improving the performance of the 
fast deployment forces. The lion's share of this sum was to go on 
ammunition. The emphasis in purchases for the army was to be on 
Finnish manufacturers, and additional anti-tank equipment and 
long-range field artillery guns were to be acquired in addition to 
modern small arms. The capacity of the Navy was to be enhanced by 
completing the shipbuilding programme approved in 1955, but the 
plan for the Air Force still fell far short of the Aircraft Committee rec-
ommendations. Efforts were to be made to purchase two squadrons 
of fighters and the three high-power radar devices needed to form 
the core of the new air surveillance system.251  
A new milestone was reached in equipment purchases in 1959, 
when budgetary funds were used for the first time to acquire material 
from the Soviet Union. This was primarily a delivery of ammunition, 
raw materials for the munitions industry, engines for patrol boats, 
a reconnaissance aircraft, various vehicles and some main battle 
tanks.252  Opportunities for still larger purchases opened up when the 
Soviet authorities announced that Finland could obtain commer-
cial credit for the purchase of arms and military equipment.253  Thus 
General Headquarters drew up its first list of such purchases in June 
1958, to a total of 5,000 mill. marks, consisting of military equipment 
belonging to the Emergency Programme, largely radar devices and 
radio communications equipment for the air surveillance system. 
The intention was also to purchase a squadron of MIG-19 fighter 
aircraft for the further development of the air defences.254 
The commercial credit obtained nevertheless turned out to be a 
good deal larger than had originally been planned, so that the total 
sum laid down in the agreement ratified in 1960 was 8,000 mill. marks 
and another credit two years later amounted to 12,000 mill. marks.255 
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The first consignment of equipment obtained on commercial 
credit was delivered more or less in the form in which the Com-
mander—in-Chief of the Defence Forces has approved it in March 
1960,256 consisting, among other things, of main battle tanks, anti-
aircraft tanks, small arms, a few transport helicopters and a second 
reconnaissance aircraft. It also led to a substantial improvement in 
the ammunition situation, as in addition to actual ammunition, it 
included almost 300 machines of various kinds that were needed in 
munitions manufacture. The Russians were not willing to sell sur-
face-to-air missiles at this stage, however, in spite of the fact that 
they had preliminarily indicated in negotiations held early in 1960 
that these would be available and had shown amazement at the 
Finns' desire to purchase anti-aircraft guns, which their military at-
tache referred to as "fireworks".257 The planned high performance 
interceptors were not acquired at this stage, as the Soviet Union was 
unwilling to sell MIG-21 planes to Finland.258 
In a decision in principle taken in December 1961 regarding 
commercial credit to be granted by the Soviet Union in 1962, the 
Defence Council placed the equipment to be purchased in order of 
importance, giving first place to air defence, second place to mari-
time defence and third place to the ground forces. The highest prior-
ity was assigned to fighter aircraft, 21 of which were to be purchased, 
the minimum number estimated to be necessary for the defence of 
Finland's neutrality. This would enable two squadrons to be formed 
for deployment in different parts of the country. Surface-to-air mis-
siles were now in second place on the Defence Council's list, the 
minimum quantity being set at two batteries, sufficient to defend 
Helsinki and its surroundings, although it would be possible to ob-
tain as many as seven batteries, depending on the price, whereup-
on protection could be provided for all the major cities of southern 
Finland. The number of missiles to be purchased for these batteries 
would be in the range 200-700.259 
The Navy was to be supplied with powerful marine diesel en-
gines to be installed in the Nuoli-class patrol boats to be built in Fin-
land later, and also with two Riga-class frigates. Top priority on the 
ground forces'list was given to a set of 3-5 long-range artillery bat-
talions with ammunition and adequate artillery tractors, main battle 
tanks and anti-aircraft tanks intended as support for these."bo 
The second part of the commercial credit was indeed used as 
planned for the 21 MIG-21 fighters, which the Soviet Union was 
now willing to sell to Finland,261 and for the frigates and diesel en-
gines for the navy, while the level of armament of the ground forces 
was improved, especially through the acquisition of the first 130 mm 
long-range field artillery guns and of reconnaissance tanks and ar-
moured personnel carriers.262 
The most problematic part of the commercial credit deal turned 
out to be the surface-to-air missiles. The leaders of the Defence 
Forces had suggested to the newly elected President of Finland in 
December 1957 that a change should be made in the regulations 
in the Treaty of Paris with regard to missiles,263 and that the Finnish 
government should apply to the other signatories for the prohibition 
on the possession of missiles to be rescinded. The issue had never-
theless dragged out into a complicated sequence of events typical 
of the logic of the Cold War, in which the major powers assessed 
the situation purely from the viewpoint of their own advantage. The 
West suspected that the sale of missiles was merely a means for the 
Soviet Union to commit Finland more closely than ever to coopera-
tion with its eastern neighbour. This might lead in peacetime to a 
situation in which Russian military advisors were placed in Finland, 
while in the case of war the Soviet Union might well insist that the 
Finnish air defence system was linked with its own in order to im-
prove the overall early warning capability, which the West estimated 
in the worst case to amount to almost 30 minutes.261 The motives 
underlying the Soviet decision to allow this re-interpretation of 
the peace treaty have never been entirely explained, but it is clear 
that one aim was to increase military cooperation between the two 
countries. It is known, for example, that General Malin of the Soviet 
Army, when visiting Finland in 1957, stated categorically that Presi-
dent Kekkonen had been informed that the military clauses should 
be deleted from the Treaty of Paris because of Soviet military inter-
ests in Finland.265 
Thus it was evidently not a question only of surface-to-air mis-
siles, which would have a relatively short range, but of the whole 
air surveillance network, which Finland was in the process of im-
proving by means of new high-power radar equipment bought from 
Britain.266  This problem was a particularly embarrassing one for the 
British government, which was trying to reach a balance between 
the political and economic rationality of the deal and the potential 
threat posed by Finnish acquisition of such missiles. The British po-
litical leadership regarded the deal as politically and economically 
advantageous, provided the Finns could also be induced to use Brit-
ish missiles. It would create new orders for the British arms indus-
try and at the same time bind Finland to the Western alliance. Thus 
the deal was also in the interests of the United States, which had 
vowed to promote economic and political measures that would sup-
port Finnish independence from the Soviet Union.261 After assessing 
the situation, the British government condescended to a change in 
the peace treaty, but the stand adopted by the Americans turned the 
whole matter upside down, as they were against any change on the 
grounds of the possibility of the Russians succeeding in pressurizing 
Finland into joining their air defence system in the event of a crisis. 
It may nevertheless have first and foremost been a question of the 
United States mistrusting Finnish foreign policy, for in the Western 
view the policy pursued by President Kekkonen, which he used from 
time to time as a lever to keep his party and himself in power, was 
already too strongly biased towards Moscow. 268 
The process of altering the peace treaty and acquiring missiles 
came to a dramatic conclusion in July 1962, when President Kek-
konen called the whole thing off, as he deemed the military ad-
vantage to be gained from such missiles to be less substantial than 
the threat to Finland's neutrality that might ensue from the country 
drifting too far into the Western camp as a consequence of the arms 
deal.269 
Although Britain agreed in October 1962 to a change in the 
provisions of the Treaty of Paris regarding missiles, none of these 
politically sensitive weapons were in fact bought for another 15 
years.271 Air-to-air missiles for the MIG fighters were bought from 
the Soviet Union, however, and so that the deal would not be a one-
sided affair, Vigilant anti-tank missiles were acquired from Britain at 
the same time. 
8.4. The Development Programme 
While delivery was still being received of the material ordered un-
der the commercial credit scheme, the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Defence Forces sent a new Development Programme (Kehittämiso-
hjelma) to the Ministry of Defence to replace the Emergency Pro-
gramme, even though this had only been in force for a few years. 
This new programme, described by him as a statement of the forces' 
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minimum requirements, had a total cost of 139,000 mill. Finnish 
marks, of which the largest sum, about 50,000 mill. would be spent 
on renewing the air defence system. The money would be used to 
purchase four squadrons of fighter aircraft, estimated to be the mini-
mum required to safeguard Finland's neutrality and prevent incur-
sions into the country's airspace. Air surveillance would be stepped 
up by acquiring high-power radar devices and about twenty target 
acquisition radars, and altogether nine batteries of surface-to-air 
missiles would be purchased to protect the main towns and cities.271  
In addition, the anti-aircraft capabilities of the field army would be 
modernized by investing 12,000 mill. marks in low-level anti-aircraft 
weapons.27- 
Of the figure of nearly 30,000 mill. marks available for improv-
ing the maritime defences, the majority would be devoted to im-
plementing the recommendations of the shipbuilding programme 
committee, which had completed its work in spring 1962. The pro-
gramme would be a continuation of the one that had been in force 
since 1955 with the aim of increasing the tonnage of the Navy to the 
maximum level allowed for in the Treaty of Paris.273 The efficiency of 
the coastal artillery would be increased by supplying it with auto-
matic gun batteries and anti-ship missiles. The Development Pro-
gramme would also double the stocks of sea mines.274 
The share of the army in this programme was to be about 40,000 
mill. marks, the majority of which would be spent on improving the 
combat efficiency of the existing units. Only one new formation 
was to be established: a second armoured brigade for counter-at-
tack operations. The main points of emphasis for the ground forces 
were to be modernization of their small arms, improvement of the 
long-range anti-tank system, modernization of the brigades'artillery 
regiments and the acquisition of long-range artillery pieces. Stocks 
of heavy ammunition and mines were to be raised to a level corre-
sponding to about a month's wartime consumption.271  
The remainder of the money, about 20,000 mill. marks, was to 
be spent on communications equipment, vehicles and maintenance 
and medical supplies, and also on improving the state of readiness 
of the armaments industry, with emphasis on increasing the capacity 
for manufacturing ammunition.276 
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8.5. What was achieved with these programmes? 
It is very difficult to evaluate precisely how well the programmes 
were carried through, what was achieved by them or what their 
overall effect was, because of the rapid changes that took place in 
their duration and content. The Initial and Emergency Programmes 
partly overlapped, for instance, and the commercial credit granted 
by the Soviet Union and the new Development Programme sent the 
Emergency Programme into confusion before it had properly be-
gun. We shall therefore consider the general trend in the arms and 
equipment situation without adhering rigidly to the acquisition pro-
grammes. 
Considerable progress was made in questions of small arms 
and anti-tank weapons for the ground forces, the latter especially 
in terms of close and medium-range equipment. The purchases of 
small arms under the commercial credit scheme were followed by 
mass orders for Finnish-made assault rifles and light machine guns, 
which gained momentum in the mid-1960s. Similarly the recoilless 
rifles obtained from Finnish suppliers brought the ground forces' 
anti-tank capabilities up to a level that could at least be regarded 
as satisfactory. The question of long-range anti-tank capability re-
mained unresolved, however, despite the acquisition of about forty 
Charioteer tanks from Britain, which were assigned to anti-tank bat-
talions directly responsible to the supreme command.277 The Vigilant 
missiles ordered from Britain and the SS-11 missiles ordered from 
France in 1964 existed in only small quantities, however, and the 
project to develop a light anti-tank vehicle in Finland came to an 
end without any orders being placed. Thus long-range anti-tank fire 
remained the province of the wartime German anti-tank artillery.278 
Since the main battle tanks acquired from the Soviet Union 
were insufficient for setting up a second armoured brigade, they 
were used to replace the outdated equipment remaining from the 
Second World War. Thus in spite of the additional equipment ob-
tained in the 1960's the founding of a second armoured brigade was 
postponed until the 19805.279  
The long-range capacity of the field artillery was improved, 
even though the commercial credit purchases enabled only a half of 
the target of 10 artillery battalions to be created. The brigade artil-
lery renewal promised in the Development Programme began with 
the modernization of the Finnish howitzers, after which there was 
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enough modern equipment for ten artillery battalions. These renew-
als continued in the second half of the decade, when the first D-30 
howitzers were ordered from the Soviet Union.280 
The ground forces' ammunition situation improved consider-
ably, so that where there had been enough ammunition in store for 
about two weeks' consumption on a war scale in 1960, the situa-
tion six years later was that most types of ammunition were held in 
amounts corresponding to about a month's requirements. The main 
shortages continued to be in mortars, anti-aircraft cannons and am-
munition for the newer types of field gun.281  
These purchases meant that the fast deployment troops, 
amounting to some 180,000 men in the early 1960s, were now satis-
factorily armed, and they received the best and newest of the equip-
ment available. The General Headquarters evaluation was that they 
were armed and equipped to an 80% level. Their greatest shortages 
concerned vehicles, particularly field gun tractors, and communica-
tions equipment. The situation for the troops making up the main 
force of about 250,000 men was not so good, and they were esti-
mated to be only 60% armed and equipped. Their equipment was 
mostly older, and frequently not yet modernized, the greatest defi-
cits being in hand weapons, communications equipment and per-
sonal equipment such as clothing, helmets and field accommoda-
tion equipment. In addition to the fast deployment forces and main 
force, a further 60,000 men had been assigned to troops for which 
no proper equipment was available other than an outdated personal 
rifle.282 
It must also be admitted that the air defence programmes were 
never entirely completed. The Air Force had a total of 11 Gnat fight-
ers and 21 MIG-21s at its disposal in 1964,283 but no new fighters 
were acquired after that until the arrival of Draken planes from 
Sweden in the early 1970s to become the other main type of air-
craft used. On the other hand, training aircraft—an essential require-
ment for any expansion of the Air Force—were obtained in sufficient 
numbers,284 and the purchase of Fouga Magister planes from France 
and Saab Safir planes from Sweden resolved the question of train-
ing aircraft.285 In spite of the modernization of the outdated anti-air-
craft artillery and the purchase of new equipment from Switzerland, 
the refurbishment of anti-aircraft facilities was postponed until the 
1970s, when the first surface-to-air missiles were obtained from the 
Soviet Union. The first large-scale purchases of anti-aircraft artillery 
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equipment from the Soviet Union also began in the late 1960s. 
The Navy's shipbuilding programme was carried through mod-
erately well, albeit with some delay. The majority of the vessels or-
dered under the programme approved in 1955 had been commis-
sioned by the late 1960s. 
Finally, it may be noted that the commencement of arms pur-
chases from the Soviet Union altered the direction of trade in this 
sphere considerably. Concerning the period 1955-1962, we may ob-
serve that all the deals that took place before 1959 were concluded 
with Western countries or firms within Finland, whereas after that 
date the Soviet Union accounted for 60% of the total and Western 
countries for 40%. This later situation also prevailed in the years 
1960-1967.286 
103 
9. Western estimates and plans regarding 
Finland 
9.1. Estimates of Finland's desire and ability to defend 
herself against the Soviet Union 
As shown in the chapters above, Finnish war plans were at least 
officially directed at coping with a potential NATO threat, but did 
such a threat really exist? What was the Western, and Swedish, view 
of the likelihood of a major war in the Nordic region of northern 
Europe? Was an attack on Finnish Lapland part of the operational 
plans for either NATO or the Norwegians? What view did the exter-
nally strictly neutral Swedes take of Finland, and what operational 
plans did they have with respect to this country? And how did the 
West look upon Finland's neutral position and the country's desire 
and ability to defend that position? 
The Western intelligence organizations were constantly as-
sessing Finland's position in the future struggle between the ma-
jor political blocs, and pessimistic views were expressed regarding 
the country's future when the Cold War set in the late 1940s. The 
general conclusion was that a communist election victory and infil-
tration of the state administration, together with pressure from the 
Soviet Union, would inexorably mean that Finland would become a 
Soviet satellite and would align itself with its eastern neighbour in 
the event of an outbreak of war. It would then become an outpost for 
Soviet troops involved in an offensive against Norway and possibly 
Sweden.287 
A threat assessment produced by the British in 1948 laid par-
ticular emphasis on northern Finland, maintaining that the Russians 
would carry out their onslaught against northern Norway, Finnmark 
and possibly northern Sweden by way of Finnish Lapland, and that 
these hostilities would be part of a broader scheme with the prob-
able aim of capturing the Straits of Denmark in order to secure the 
Baltic Sea region, establishing a number of bases for future action 
against the sea routes between Europe and the United States and 
forming a front-line air defence system to pre-empt a US nuclear 
strike 288 
It was envisaged that the Russians would carry out their offen- 
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sive in northern Norway by attacking through Finnish Lapland with 
one division while landing another division in the Narvik area. In 
the event of an operation directed at northern Sweden, two divisions 
would be dispatched to that area via the Tornio Valley.289 
Examined from a defensive viewpoint, the situation was that 
the Soviet Union was expected to use Finland to some extent as part 
of its buffer zone, one indication of which was regarded as being 
the Control Commission directive that restricted deployment of the 
Finnish coastal artillery entirely to the area east of the Porkkala Pen- 
insula. This incorporation of the coastal defences of southern Finland 
into the extensive protective zone constructed in front of Leningrad, 
to which the Porkkala base was regarded as belonging, could be seen 
as creating a powerful defence system for the city comparable to the 
Peter the Great marine fortifications during the First World War.29° 
A new estimate produced in 1949 detected an improvement in 
Finland's position, however. In spite of Soviet pressure and a cer- 
tain measure of internal unrest, there had been no actual uprising 
or communist revolution. On the contrary, the electoral defeat of 
the communists was judged to have given the country more room 
for manoeuvring. All the evaluations laid great store by the internal 
situation in Finland, which was interpreted as reflecting a commit-
ment to national defence.291  
In their assessments of the danger of another world war, drawn 
up in the early 1950s, the United States and Britain regarded a sepa- 
rate war in northern Europe as unlikely. Any Soviet invasion in the 
north would merely be part of an operation directed against Cen-
tral Europe, and no more than ten divisions could be expected to 
be deployed in the north of Scandinavia, eight of which would be 
used in an attack on Sweden, which could most conveniently be ac-
complished down the Tornio Valley, through Finnish territory, while 
one or two divisions would enter Norway over land. One attractive 
alternative for this would be a route through Finnish Lapland, where 
there were two roads leading into Norway, whereas there was no di- 
rect land connection between Soviet territory and northern Norway. 
It should also be noted that a rapid advance to the sea at Skibotn 
would have cut the Norwegians' lines of communication with their 
troops in the high north. Similarly, the Soviet Union could have used 
the Finnish railways for concentrating troops against Sweden, and 
this system was capable in theory of transporting and maintaining 
up to 18 divisions.292 
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The suitability of Finland as a springboard for an attack on 
NATO, together with the provisions of the Agreement of Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, meant that Soviet demands in 
the event of war would have above all concerned free and safe pas-
sage through Finnish territory. In order to extend the war to the Gulf 
of Bothnia, the Russians would have had to make use of the ports on 
the west coast of Finland, as they would not have been able to de-
mand access to Aland until just before the attack, so as not to arouse 
the Swedes'suspicions, and similarly, air operations would have ne-
cessitated use of all the airfields in northern Finland, at least. Would 
the Finns have acceded to these demands in a peaceable manner? 
The British view was that they would, provided the demands were 
restricted to the extreme north of the country, but if they had ex-
tended to the south, by including the airports of southern Finland, 
for instance, the Finns would probably not have acquiesced.293  
The general assessment did not alter decisively during the 
1950s. Finland would have served as a buffer zone and defence zone 
for the Soviet Union, and the role of northern Finland gained slowly 
in importance with the adoption of submarine-mounted intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles in the Soviet nuclear triad. It was thus in 
Soviet interests to develop military cooperation, especially as far as 
air surveillance was concerned.294 
The Swedes' view of Finland as a springboard for a Soviet of-
fensive was very similar to that prevailing in Britain. A memorandum 
from the chief of the Swedish General Headquarters, Major-Gen-
eral Richard Åkerman, to the British Air Force attache sheds some 
light on the prevailing opinions at that time. Any Soviet military 
action against Sweden would be part of a larger operation against 
NATO, and a separate war between Sweden and the Soviet Union 
was highly unlikely. If the Soviet army were to attack northern Swe-
den it would have two alternative approaches. It could either invade 
northern Norway first and then enter Sweden after preparing its 
passage through Finnish territory, or else it could commence op-
erations against northern Sweden and northern Norway simulta-
neously. Finland was ill-equipped both politically and militarily to 
resist Soviet intentions and would be obliged to yield to Soviet pres-
sure, if only on account of the Cooperation Agreement. And even if 
the Finns were to resist, it would only take a few days for the Rus-
sian troops to reach the Swedish frontier. They could well deploy 
up to twenty divisions against Sweden, although this would admit- 
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tedly require a month of preparations in Finland. One reason for 
this highly pessimistic evaluation of the situation as far as Finland 
was concerned was that its troops were restricted to the above-men-
tioned complement of 41,900 men under the Treaty of Paris and the 
Swedes—somewhat surprisingly—had not taken account of the Finn-
ish mobilization system, or else they had assumed that the Soviet 
Union was capable of mounting a surprise attack.295 
It was assumed that a Soviet attack on northern Sweden would 
be directed primarily over the border with Finland and that it might 
include at a later stage a landing from the Gulf of Bothnia in the rear 
of the Swedish troops defending northern Norrland, or alternatively 
a large-scale airborne operation.296 
The Americans were of the same opinion as the British and 
Swedish commentators regarding the ability of the Finnish Defence 
Forces to repel a Soviet invasion. Having been purged of commu- 
nists, these forces were evidently capable of dealing with internal 
threats, but their capacity would not suffice against a Soviet attack. 
If the Soviet Union were to take Finland it would become embroiled 
in at least some measure of guerrilla warfare, and thus it could not 
be expected to mount any form of offensive purely against Finland, 
as the disadvantages would outweigh the advantages.297 
The Soviet interference in Finland's internal affairs during the 
Night Frost crisis of 1958 and the Note Crisis three years later in- 
spired a set of new estimates of the Finnish position. The latter event 
in particular had direct repercussions in the form of Finnish purchas-
es of military equipment from the West, as described in the chapter 
on arms and equipment above. These crises were estimated in the 
West to have detracted from Finland's political and military room for 
manoeuvres after a period with a more relaxed atmosphere in the 
1950s during which the country had become a member of both the 
United Nations and the Nordic Council. Incorporation in the Soviet 
sphere of influence would naturally have been an undesirable thing 
for Finland in a military sense, but what concrete value could it have 
been to the Soviet Union? 
In its review of the Finnish armed forces in the immediate wake 
of the Note Crisis, the British Joint Intelligence Committee estimat- 
ed that the clearest advantage to the Soviet Union would have been 
the integration of Finnish air surveillance into the Soviet air defence 
system. It was deemed unlikely that any land bases would be set up, 
as the political benefit would be less than the military benefit. The 
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committee commented most bitterly, however, on the arms deals 
that had begun in 1960, maintaining that these could enable the 
Soviet Union to bind the Finnish Defence Forces more closely to its 
own advisory and spare part systems. In accordance with the logic 
of the Cold War, the arms deals were regarded as one of the most 
alarming manifestations of communist subversion. Western intelli-
gence was apparently quite unable to appreciate that the arms could 
just as well be deployed against their manufacturer, for such an idea 
was contrary to the Cold War thinking that"he who is not for us is 
against us". 
9.2. Reconnaissance and nuclear war in Finnmark-Nor-
wegian plans 
The sparsely populated areas of northern Norway gained greatly in 
importance in the early 1950s, as the Kola Peninsula gradually ac-
quired a more prominent role in the Soviet strategy. Plans for the 
deployment of ground forces drawn up as early as 1949 had as-
signed half a brigade to this area in the north, and it became obvi-
ous later that it was essential to station adequate troops there even 
under peacetime conditions. Thus a brigade was eventually assigned 
to Finnmark and reached operational strength in June 1953. This 
meant in practice that the force of 5000 men in the region was at the 
highest level of readiness of any troops in the whole of Norway.298  
Northern Finland was naturally an area of the greatest signifi-
cance for the defence of northern Norway, as the best roads leading 
to the latter region from the Soviet Union passed through Finnish 
Lapland. Thus Finland and its political and military relations with 
the Soviet Union were crucial considerations in Norwegian threat 
scenarios from the very onset of the Cold War.299 
As the Norwegian threat scenario specifically involved an over-
land attack by Soviet troops on northern Norway—in that the Rus-
sians, true to their doctrine, were assumed to take the offensive in 
any war situation—Norwegian intelligence was concentrated princi-
pally on the Kola Peninsula. Prior to the construction of an extensive 
electronic surveillance system in northern Norway, this intelligence 
had mainly been gathered by means of patrols or reconnaissance 
aircraft, with the Norwegian intelligence service sending out former 
Finnish long-distance patrol men with the silent approval of the 
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Finnish authorities to monitor the situation not only on the Kola 
Peninsula but also at the Alakurtti air base and the Stalin Canal."' 
As Norway was the only NATO country having a common 
boundary with the Soviet Union, and as the Kola Peninsula had 
grown in importance with the build-up of the Soviet northern Fleet 
there, the area was an especially interesting one from an intelligence 
point of view. This meant that the United States became interested 
in closer intelligence collaboration in the early 1950s, a situation that 
was made official with the signing of the NORUSA agreement in 
December 1954. This collaboration was not restricted to intelligence 
on Norwegian soil, however, but also involved the use of intelligence 
trawlers on the Barents Sea and reconnaissance flights from Nor-
wegian air bases. The best concrete example of the latter was the 
celebrated U-2 reconnaissance plane shot down near Sverdlovsk on 
May 1st 1960, which had set out from Pakistan and was due to land 
at the Bodo airfield in Norway.301  
Finnmark also occupied a ringside seat when it came to elec-
tronic intelligence methods, as it was possible from there to acquire 
information on both the movements of the Soviet northern Fleet 
and the activities of the ground forces deployed on the Kola Pen-
insula. This convenient location was exploited to the full for intel-
ligence purposes, as the Norwegians built no less than six receiving 
stations to monitor different areas of the electromagnetic spectrum 
on the strip of land between Finland and the Arctic Ocean.302 
Although the Norwegians made no preparations for conven-
tional warfare in Finnish territory, they did have plans to operate 
there. Preparations were made in the early 1950s to send intelligence 
patrols and groups capable of guerrilla warfare into Finnish Lapland, 
with instructions to blow up bridges on the main roads through Lap-
land. Similarly, in order to gain information on later deployments of 
Soviet troops, lookout posts were to be set up for observing Soviet 
convoys entering Finland.303 
These plans were retained until the early 1960s at least and the 
basic idea behind them remained the same. The reconnaissance and 
sabotage parties would begin gathering intelligence as soon as they 
had reached their stations, but would do so at full intensity only after 
receiving separate orders to this effect. The primary aim was to locate 
the Soviet nuclear weapon launching pads and anti-aircraft batter-
ies, on the assumption that the Soviet Union would use short-range 
nuclear weapons, or at least prepare to use them, from the begin- 
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ving of any new war. It was the intention of the Norwegians to enlist 
Finns to help them in acquiring such information."' 
The Norwegians planned to use their ground forces located in 
northern Norway in a defensive capacity. As far as the terrain was 
concerned, the line of the River Lyngen north of Tromso was a suit-
able level for mounting a defence even against a threat from the 
direction of Finland, as the route through Kilpisjärvi in Finland natu-
rally led to Skibotn, which was north of Lyngen on the Norwegian 
coast. This idea was also supported by the fact that the Germans 
had established a major defence line at that point at the end of the 
Second World War. Thus the NATO Medium-Term Defence Plan in 
the early 1950s had been based on arresting any Soviet invasion at 
the level of Lyngen, and the situation remained the same up to the 
early 1960s.305 
It is this clear that the Norwegians had no plans for ground 
force penetration into Finnish territory other than for the use of 
guerrilla and reconnaissance patrols against Soviet communications. 
The reason for this lay partly in the resources available, as NATO 
had scarcely any resources for strengthening the Norwegian defenc-
es in terms of conventional forces during the 1950s and early 1960s, 
and although high priority was assigned to Norway in the plans 
for an Allied Command Europe Mobile Force to be created in 1960 
to strengthen the NATO flanks, no useful military purpose could 
have been served by such an incursion. Indeed these reinforcements 
amounting to a brigade or so would have been largely symbolic rela-
tive to the firepower of the Soviet divisions. NATO activity on the 
northern front began to achieve concrete proportions only around 
the mid-1960s, when the Express exercises were first held in north-
ern Norway,306  and the days of the major reinforcements earmarked 
for the defence of Norway, such as the American II Marine Expedi-
tionary Force, were still far away in the future, in the 19805 .307 
A more aggressive approach was adopted in the case of the Air 
Force. The Norwegians had already developed some of their air bases 
to meet the needs of the American Strategic Air Command in the 
early 1950s, and a detachment from the 3rd US Air Force stationed 
in Britain, to be known as the 3' Air Force Task Force North, was 
ordered in 1956 to make preparations for action on Norwegian ter-
ritory, centred on the Bodo base, in the event of an outbreak of war. 
These troops were also to be capable of receiving and storing NATO 
nuclear weapons in a crisis situation, as the Norwegians had refused 
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to do so in peacetime. The Norwegian Air Force also prepared itself 
for supporting nuclear strikes, and some of its fighter-bomber pilots 
underwent training for missions on which nuclear weapons were to 
be carried. The main tasks of the Air Force detachments stationed in 
northern Norway were nevertheless to provide air support for nucle-
ar strikes. The reconnaissance squadrons would be used to locate the 
target of each raid and assess the impact, and the fighter squadrons 
would engage and saturate the Soviet air defences with conventional 
weapons. The majority of the targets were in the Soviet Union, but 
operation within Finland was also considered a possibility if the So-
viet troops were to use the country or any part of it as a base.308 
9.3. Swedish plans 
Sweden had succeeded in remaining outside the Second World War 
by adopting a realist policy of adaptation to the prevailing military 
and political situation, and had then declared itself non-aligned at 
the end of war, although in practise its economic and political in-
terests lay with the West. Since its only perceived threat was felt to 
be an ideologically aggressive Soviet Union, its military planning 
was aimed first and foremost at countering that threat. Thus the 
new round of operational planning initiated by the Swedish Military 
Headquarters after the war had two alternative points of departure: 
II—war with the Soviet Union, and III—war with the United States 
and Britain,309 of which the latter was regarded as highly improbable, 
as first Britain and later the United States had attempted to persuade 
the Swedes into the closest possible cooperation with the West.310 
Alternative II comprised three separate scenarios. In scenario II 
S the main threat was to southern Sweden, so that the majority of 
the armed forces, four divisions and two armoured brigades, would 
be concentrated in that area, while under II C it was assumed that 
the main enemy targets, and therefore the main emphasis in de-
fence, would be in Central Sweden, around Stockholm.311  The third 
scenario, II N, envisaged a Russian attack in the north, through Fin-
land, whereupon it would be necessary to station an army corps of 
four divisions in northern Sweden rather than the two divisions as-
signed to that area in the first two scenarios. It was estimated that 
formation of these troops and their assembly and transfer to the 
north would take about a month.312 
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The purpose of the army stationed in the north was to repel an 
enemy attack either at a point on the River Kalix, about 30 km from 
the Finnish border, or a point further back, on the line Luleå Boden, 
about 80 km from the Finnish border. If the army was forced to retreat 
in the face of an overwhelming force it would have two routes open 
to it, the road along the coast, or if there was a danger of an enemy 
landing to cut off this route, the inland road network. The aim then 
would be to create the best possible conditions for a counter-attack by 
the reserves under the Commander-in-Chief in Central Sweden.113 
These defence plans were supplemented in 1958 with a fourth 
scenario. The starting point for scenario II SN was a double-headed 
attack by Soviet forces from the north and south simultaneously.314 
This state of affairs corresponded fairly well to the Western theory 
that the Soviet Union would seek to capture Denmark and northern 
Norway and would then begin a new phase in its hostilities with a 
bid to occupy Sweden and Norway. The plan for the defence of Swe-
den against such an attack entailed the concentration of six brigades 
in the north of Sweden and 12 in the south.315 
In a revision of the defence plans that began early in 1962, 
an operation order from the Commander in Chief (ÖB Opo 1967) 
would in all threat situations lead to the concentration of six bri-
gades and three armoured battalions on the Finnish border, i.e. the 
quantity of troops marshalled there would not differ appreciably 
from that allowed for in the 1958 plans. The interesting thing about 
the new order from the Finnish point of view was that the areas of 
responsibility for the Swedish defence regions were extended be-
yond the country's borders, so that southern Finland was regarded 
as belonging to the defence region responsible for Stockholm and 
Central Sweden (Milo 0) and Central and northern Finland to the 
region responsible for northern Sweden (Milo ÖN). In practise this 
was a matter of intelligence and air operations. Early warnings were 
of crucial importance to the Swedes, as the formation and grouping 
of troops for service in northern Sweden in particular would need a 
certain amount of preparation time. One estimate produced at the 
time of the Note Crisis of 1961 was that the Russians would in the 
worst case be able to prepare a major attack in Finland with 20 di-
visions in about a month by taking advantage of the Cooperation 
Agreement.316 Apart from electronic methods and the use of a spy 
network, the Swedes would attempt to acquire information by send-
ing intelligence units to Finland. Jaeger battalions would be respon- 
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sible for this in the area immediately adjacent to the border, and 
special parachute troops, suitable for long-range reconnaissance, 
dropped from civilian or military aircraft partly prior to the outbreak 
of hostilities,317 would be used further into Finnish territory, particu-
larly to observe major traffic junctions in order to assess the strength 
of the Soviet contingents. 
Apart from intelligence activities, the Swedish ground forces 
evidently had no plans for operating against troops present on Finn-
ish soil, but the Swedish Air Force had a more aggressive outlook, 
largely by virtue of the substantial expansion of its capacity during 
the 1950s, when it took delivery of more than a thousand first-class 
fighter aircraft produced by the country's own aircraft industry.318 
Thus two out of the five groups (eskader) were assigned duties in 
Finnish airspace in the early 1950s. The 3rd Eskader was to operate 
against airfields and ground troops in southwestern Finland and the 
5th Eskader was to make fighter sweeps across the northwestern part 
of the country and attacks on air bases and missile bases.319 
The situation altered very little in the course of the 1950s, al-
though the number of groups was reduced to four. The 3rd Eskader 
was still to have operated against targets in southwestern Finland 
and the Åland Islands and the principal duties of the 411 Eskader 
now included attacks on Finnish territory and aerial reconnaissance 
over an area extending as far as the line Porkkala—Tallinn.320 
The Swedes, like the Finns, employed war games in an attempt 
to simulate the use of nuclear weapons, but one significant difference 
in their thinking relative to the Finns was that they repeatedly as-
sumed that they would have access to NATO nuclear warheads and 
would be able to use these on targets within Finland.321 Similarly the 
plans—or rather visions—of having nuclear weapons of their own ap-
parently impinged on Finland, in that a broad-based feasibility study 
carried out in the early 1960s in which it was assumed that the coun-
try had about 100 twenty kiloton nuclear devices at its disposal came 
to the conclusion that these could be deployed with the maximum 
advantage against a Soviet invasion fleet while it was still in port, or 
else against the invading troops while they were concentrated in a 
narrow bridgehead area. A corresponding situation was envisaged 
if an aggressor were to attempt to break through the Swedish de-
fences in the Tornio Valley. Although it was considered unlikely that 
the attacking force could be destroyed with nuclear weapons, a good 
deal of effect could be had on its supply lines.322 
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10. Conclusions 
Where a conflict with the Soviet Union had been the starting point 
for Finnish defence planning prior to the Second World War, the out- 
come of that war reshaped the country's military policy entirely, and 
this had a direct effect on defence planning. The overall guidelines 
for Finland's post-war defensive position laid down by the Defence 
Revision Committee, was based on the possibility of the country be- 
coming involved in an East—West conflict in which the Western Al-
lies might extend their military operations into Finnish territory. A 
war with the Soviet Union was regarded as unlikely on account of 
the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance 
concluded between the two countries in 1948. 
Operational planning was suspended in 1945-1948 because 
General Headquarters wished to avoid differences of interpretation 
with the Allied Control Commission appointed to supervised the 
terms of the Armistice Agreement, and it was only once the Par-
is Peace Treaty had been signed and the commission had left the 
country that President Paasikivi authorized the Defence Forces to re-
commence operational planning and preparations for mobilization. 
By the time the Revision Committee submitted its report in 
1949 the Operations Division at General Headquarters, which had 
taken charge of operational planning, had gathered together the 
necessary material on which to base the threat scenario for such a 
plan. This scenario, which was consistent with the spirit of both the 
Cooperation Agreement and the committee's report, consisted of 
three alternatives: 
A. An attack on Finland from northern Norway. 
B. Simultaneous attacks on Finland from northern Norway and 
the Baltic Sea, an assumption based on the idea of NATO 
success on its northern front that had opened the way for 
naval operations in the northern Baltic, with the conse-
quence that these might extend to Finland in the form of 
landings on the south and south-west coasts. 
C. Given that one point of departure for alternatives A and B 
had been Sweden's continued neutrality, it was assumed in 
alternative C that Sweden had joined the Western alliance 
against the Soviet Union and that as a direct consequence 
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of this there was a threat of invasion on the land boundary 
with Sweden and by sea over the Gulf of Bothnia. 
The first operational plan, for the "auxiliary complement" per-
mitted under the Treaty of Paris, was drawn up in 1950 and implied 
an increase in the strength of the Defence Forces to 41,900 men, the 
maximum laid down in the treaty. The plan defined the principle 
tasks of such a force as being: 
- to guarantee Finnish neutrality 
- to protect selected targets and installations, and 
- to carry out limited military operations. 
Since the troops defined in this complement were insufficient 
to defend the whole territory of Finland, a further mobilization 
would have to be undertaken for this purpose. This was quite pos-
sible to accomplish, as the conscription produced a reserve of tens of 
thousands of men each year. Preparations for mobilization entailed 
a legality problem, of course, as in the spirit of the Treaty of Paris the 
Finnish Defence Forces were supposed to be capable only of local 
military operations. The Finns nevertheless interpreted the situation 
as being that the provisions of the treaty would automatically cease 
to be binding should the country become the object of an enemy 
attack. This view gained support from the UN Charter, which guar-
anteed every state the right to defend its sovereignty. Since this was 
a question of interpretation, however, information on such prepara-
tions was scarcely ever communicated beyond the confines of the 
Defence Forces themselves, an application of the extreme confiden-
tiality that was typical of operational preparations at that period in 
time. 
The first defence plan to cover the whole country, drawn up 
in 1951-1952, allowed for its defences to be organized on a region-
al basis. Finland was divided into four areas of responsibility, each 
under a commander who was responsible for all defence prepara-
tions in his area. In practise, however, this regional principle was not 
implemented entirely, as the military provinces and military districts 
responsible for mobilization were still subordinate to General Head-
quarters. 
Altogether the Defence Forces had four levels of readiness, a 
basic level and three higher levels to which they could be raised pro-
gressively according to the perceived threat: 
- peacetime forces 
- auxiliary complement (41,900 men) 
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- fast deployment force (320,000 men) 
- wartime complement (500,000 men) 
The plan envisaged operations as dependent on a series of con-
secutive defence zones, the number and density of which varied from 
one region to another. In the sparsely populated areas of the north 
there were vast tracts of wilderness between the zones, whereas in 
the core area in the south, where any loss of territory could have had 
direct repercussions for the defence of the whole country, the zones 
were only a few tens of kilometres apart. The plan stressed the com-
mencement of resistance immediately from the national boundary, 
and also placed emphasis on active guerrilla tactics in the areas be-
tween the defence zones. 
The retraction of the Soviet troops from the Porkkala Peninsula, 
the gaining of full membership of the United Nations and admission 
to the Nordic Council strengthened Finland's political position con- 
siderably and enabled very much more emphasis to be laid on neu-
trality. Thus neutrality became the hallmark of Finnish foreign policy, 
and this was reflected in the Defence Forces' operational planning, 
perhaps the most concrete example being the inclusion of separate 
neutrality surveillance troops in the Defence Force complement in 
1956. 
The second round of defence planning began after the resto-
ration of the Porkkala area. The plans adopted at the end of 1957 
and beginning of 1958 did not differ from the previous ones in any 
decisive sense, and they had still been drawn up very much in the 
spirit of the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual As- 
sistance, but the threat scenarios on which they were based had been 
constantly updated throughout the decade. The concept of extensive 
NATO ground operations in Finland gradually faded as more re- 
alistic estimates of that organization's resources became available, 
and by the end of the decade it had begun to appear probable that 
the Soviet Union would be a more active party to any conflict that 
NATO as far as northern Europe was concerned. 
Thus a serious discrepancy began to emerge between the realis-
tic threat scenario and actual operational planning by the late 1950s, 
and it became necessary to revise the plans in a broader political 
context. The point of departure for this was still compliance with the 
provisions of the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance, however, as the military leadership, with its suspicions of 
the military and political motives of the Soviet Union, was required 
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to pay due attention to political realities. It still had to be able to 
convince the Soviet Union that Finland was prepared to meet its 
political obligations without Soviet assistance, for any closer military 
cooperation with that country would have immediately shattered its 
emerging image of neutrality, with disastrous consequences both 
politically and economically. 
From the late 1950s onwards the defence plans began to take 
note of the threat posed by the Soviet Union, so that although they 
were primarily geared towards fulfilling Finland's obligations under 
the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, 
they also contained elements that were directed against a threat 
from the east. These took numerous forms. Plans were laid, for in-
stance, for making use of the defence line that had been created on 
the eastern boundary during the Second World War, and the major-
ity of the reserve troops placed under direct General Headquarters 
command were formed in the command responsible for the eastern 
border, so that by the end of the decade the tasks which these troops 
were to be prepared to discharge included defence of the border. It 
should be remembered, however, that there were certain areas, such 
as Helsinki and the Aland Islands, that the Defence Forces were to 
be prepared to defend in all situations, no matter whether the threat 
came from the east or from the west. 
The role of the Frontier Guard, an institution subordinate to the 
Ministry of the Interior rather than the Ministry of Defence, within 
the fast deployment forces intended to protect full wartime mobili-
zation activities was increased significantly in the 1960s by raising 
the strength of the troops to be formed in that category and making 
a purposeful effort to develop their military capabilities. The reason 
for this was the change in the perceived threat, for the points of 
departure for the evaluation procedure were no longer exclusively 
questions of political expediency but also extended to military per-
formance. The crucial question was for whom it would be a realistic 
proposition to attack Finland, and the Operations Division at Gen-
eral Headquarters came to the conclusion that the Soviet Union had 
the greatest likelihood of doing so. This assessment was based most 
of all on the level of Soviet rearmament and its capacity for mount-
ing an attack with its existing peacetime forces. It was for this reason 
that the most prominent threat scenario became that of a surprise 
attack from the east. 
The first significant step towards suppressing any potential sur- 
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prise attack was to develop Finland's military capability, a process 
that began to take on new forms. New standing troops were created 
on the cadre principle, so that they would be available quickly for 
their first operational assignments, including protection of sites of 
national importance—in other words the principal targets for a sur-
prise attack. These standing forces were to be ready to go into action 
at six hours' notice and were to reach their full wartime complement, 
with reinforcements from the reserves, within 36 hours. In addition, 
more determined efforts than ever were made to develop the dis-
persed territorial regional defence system. 
The most tangible and durable response to the threat of a sur-
prise attack was the development of a comprehensive local defence 
system alongside the dispersed mobilization system. This work was 
still in its early stages when the peacetime defence complement was 
revised in 1966, but local defence and guerrilla warfare as its central 
component were to become integral parts of the defence system in 
future decades. 
The new territorial defence system fitted in well with contem-
porary requirements, both politically and military, and as a system 
that covered the whole country it provided excellent support for a 
policy of neutrality that was not obviously directed against anyone 
in particular but was designed to keep Finland out of any conflict 
between the world powers. 
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